In gambling, a Dutch book or lock is a set of odds and bets, established by the bookmaker, that ensures that the bookmaker will profit—at the expense of the gamblers—regardless of the outcome of the event (a horse race, for example) on which the gamblers bet. It is associated with probabilities implied by the odds not being coherent.
In economics, the term usually refers to a sequence of trades that would leave one party strictly worse off and another strictly better off. Typical assumptions in consumer choice theory rule out the possibility that anyone can be Dutch-booked.
In philosophy it is used to explore degrees of certainty of beliefs.
There is no agreement on the etymology of the term.
The main point of the Dutch book argument is to show that rational people must have subjective probabilities for random events, and that these probabilities must satisfy the standard axioms of probability. Objectivists believe in frequency theory definitions of probability, which refer to objective outcomes of events like coin flips. This creates a problem in defining probabilities for random events like horse races—we cannot repeat the event under identical circumstances to learn the probabilities, which would correspond to the proportion of wins in the long run.
Subjectivists argue that probabilities can be defined via beliefs. Objectivists say that beliefs are too vague and qualitative to use for probabilities. The Dutch book argument (see also the related money pump argument) aims to show that beliefs about probabilities must be quantitative and satisfy standard probability axioms. This is done by first assuming that people with subjective probabilities would be willing to take fair bets on the basis of these probabilities. Then it is shown that if these subjective probabilities do not satisfy probability axioms, we can create a "Dutch book"—a collection of bets which would ensure sure losses for the holder of these "incoherent" beliefs, regardless of the outcome of the random events. The objection can be made that many people do not gamble.
This page is automatically generated and may contain information that is not correct, complete, up-to-date, or relevant to your search query. The same applies to every other page on this website. Please make sure to verify the information with EPFL's official sources.
In a thought experiment proposed by the Italian probabilist Bruno de Finetti in order to justify Bayesian probability, an array of wagers is coherent precisely if it does not expose the wagerer to certain loss regardless of the outcomes of events on which they are wagering, even if their opponent makes the most judicious choices. One must set the price of a promise to pay 1ifJohnSmithwinstomorrow′selection,and0 otherwise.
Bayesian epistemology is a formal approach to various topics in epistemology that has its roots in Thomas Bayes' work in the field of probability theory. One advantage of its formal method in contrast to traditional epistemology is that its concepts and theorems can be defined with a high degree of precision. It is based on the idea that beliefs can be interpreted as subjective probabilities. As such, they are subject to the laws of probability theory, which act as the norms of rationality.
Frank Plumpton Ramsey (ˈræmzi; 22 February 1903 – 19 January 1930) was a British philosopher, mathematician, and economist who made major contributions to all three fields before his death at the age of 26. He was a close friend of Ludwig Wittgenstein and, as an undergraduate, translated Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus into English. He was also influential in persuading Wittgenstein to return to philosophy and Cambridge. Like Wittgenstein, he was a member of the Cambridge Apostles, the secret intellectual society, from 1921.