Tit for tatTit for tat is an English saying meaning "equivalent retaliation". It developed from "tip for tap", first recorded in 1558. It is also a highly effective strategy in game theory. An agent using this strategy will first cooperate, then subsequently replicate an opponent's previous action. If the opponent previously was cooperative, the agent is cooperative. If not, the agent is not. Tit-for-tat has been very successfully used as a strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma.
Games and Economic BehaviorGames and Economic Behavior (GEB) is a journal of game theory published by Elsevier. Founded in 1989, the journal's stated objective is to communicate game-theoretic ideas across theory and applications. It is considered to be the leading journal of game theory and one of the top journals in economics, and it is one of the two official journals of the Game Theory Society. Apart from game theory and economics, the research areas of the journal also include applications of game theory in political science, biology, computer science, mathematics and psychology.
Rational agentA rational agent or rational being is a person or entity that always aims to perform optimal actions based on given premises and information. A rational agent can be anything that makes decisions, typically a person, firm, machine, or software. The concept of rational agents can be found in various disciplines such as artificial intelligence, cognitive science, decision theory, economics, ethics, game theory, and the study of practical reason. In reference to economics, rational agent refers to hypothetical consumers and how they make decisions in a free market.
Centipede gameIn game theory, the centipede game, first introduced by Robert Rosenthal in 1981, is an extensive form game in which two players take turns choosing either to take a slightly larger share of an increasing pot, or to pass the pot to the other player. The payoffs are arranged so that if one passes the pot to one's opponent and the opponent takes the pot on the next round, one receives slightly less than if one had taken the pot on this round, but after an additional switch the potential payoff will be higher.
Q-learningQ-learning is a model-free reinforcement learning algorithm to learn the value of an action in a particular state. It does not require a model of the environment (hence "model-free"), and it can handle problems with stochastic transitions and rewards without requiring adaptations. For any finite Markov decision process (FMDP), Q-learning finds an optimal policy in the sense of maximizing the expected value of the total reward over any and all successive steps, starting from the current state.
Hotelling's lawHotelling's law is an observation in economics that in many markets it is rational for producers to make their products as similar as possible. This is also referred to as the principle of minimum differentiation as well as Hotelling's linear city model. The observation was made by Harold Hotelling (1895–1973) in the article "Stability in Competition" in Economic Journal in 1929. The opposing phenomenon is product differentiation, which is usually considered to be a business advantage if executed properly.
Alpha–beta pruningAlpha–beta pruning is a search algorithm that seeks to decrease the number of nodes that are evaluated by the minimax algorithm in its search tree. It is an adversarial search algorithm used commonly for machine playing of two-player combinatorial games (Tic-tac-toe, Chess, Connect 4, etc.). It stops evaluating a move when at least one possibility has been found that proves the move to be worse than a previously examined move. Such moves need not be evaluated further.
Evolution and the Theory of GamesEvolution and the Theory of Games is a book by the British evolutionary biologist John Maynard Smith on evolutionary game theory. The book was initially published in December 1982 by Cambridge University Press. In the book, John Maynard Smith summarises work on evolutionary game theory that had developed in the 1970s, to which he made several important contributions. The book is also noted for being well written and not overly mathematically challenging.
CollusionCollusion is a deceitful agreement or secret cooperation between two or more parties to limit open competition by deceiving, misleading or defrauding others of their legal right. Collusion is not always considered illegal. It can be used to attain objectives forbidden by law; for example, by defrauding or gaining an unfair market advantage. It is an agreement among firms or individuals to divide a market, set prices, limit production or limit opportunities.
Core (game theory)In cooperative game theory, the core is the set of feasible allocations or imputations where no coalition of agents can benefit by breaking away from the grand coalition. One can think of the core corresponding to situations where it is possible to sustain cooperation among all agents. A coalition is said to improve upon or block a feasible allocation if the members of that coalition can generate more value among themselves than they are allocated in the original allocation.
