Joint criminal enterprise

Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) is a legal doctrine used during war crimes tribunals to allow the prosecution of members of a group for the actions of the group. This doctrine considers each member of an organized group individually responsible for crimes committed by group within the common plan or purpose. It arose through the application of the idea of common purpose and has been applied by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to prosecute political and military leaders for mass war crimes, including genocide, committed during the Yugoslav Wars 1991–1999. For example, "if three people commit a bank robbery and one fatally shoots a person in the process, the law considers all guilty of murder". The concept of "collective liability" where more than one person can share liability and punishment for the actions of another person is not universally accepted and is considered by some to be a form of human rights abuse, while others believe it is just. Without a certain degree of cooperation and coordination of actions, it is virtually impossible to perpetrate atrocities such as genocide or crimes against humanity. The first usages of joint criminal enterprise doctrine are identified in post-World War II cases, in which the doctrine was used under the name common purpose (or joint enterprise), or without specific naming. However, the origins of the doctrine may be influenced by the common law of England, which introduced the principle into criminal law in the UK and other Commonwealth nations such as Australia. A similar legal principle can also be found in Texas, USA, where it is known as the Law of Parties. The notion of collective liability and shared punishment for the actions of others as if all perpetrated the same deed may be much older, and was used to justify extermination of religious and cultural groups, such as the Albigensian "Heretics" and those who harbored them. Critics argue that joint criminal enterprise can lead to excessive legal process and punishments, that it lowers the evidential bar in favour of prosecution, and that it runs counter to the spirit of Blackstone's formulation.