Word (computer architecture) | EPFL Graph Search

In computing, a word is the natural unit of data used by a particular processor design. A word is a fixed-sized datum handled as a unit by the instruction set or the hardware of the processor. The number of bits or digits in a word (the word size, word width, or word length) is an important characteristic of any specific processor design or computer architecture. The size of a word is reflected in many aspects of a computer's structure and operation; the majority of the registers in a processor are usually word-sized and the largest datum that can be transferred to and from the working memory in a single operation is a word in many (not all) architectures. The largest possible address size, used to designate a location in memory, is typically a hardware word (here, "hardware word" means the full-sized natural word of the processor, as opposed to any other definition used). Documentation for older computers with fixed word size commonly states memory sizes in words rather than bytes

Exploiting Errors for Efficiency: A Survey from Circuits to Applications

Mattia Cacciotti, Alexandros Daglis, Eva Darulova, Babak Falsafi, Sasa Misailovic, Damien Zufferey

When a computational task tolerates a relaxation of its specification or when an algorithm tolerates the effects of noise in its execution, hardware, system software, and programming language compilers or their runtime systems can trade deviations from correct behavior for lower resource usage. We present, for the first time, a synthesis of research results on computing systems that only make as many errors as their end-to-end applications can tolerate. The results span the disciplines of computer-aided design of circuits, digital system design, computer architecture, programming languages, operating systems, and information theory. Rather than over-provisioning the resources controlled by each of these layers of abstraction to avoid errors, it can be more efficient to exploit the masking of errors occurring at one layer and thereby prevent those errors from propagating to a higher layer. We demonstrate the potential benefits of end-to-end approaches using two illustrative examples. We introduce a formalization of terminology that allows us to present a coherent view across the techniques traditionally used by different research communities in their individual layer of focus. Using this formalization, we survey tradeoffs for individual layers of computing systems at the circuit, architecture, operating system, and programming language levels as well as fundamental information-theoretic limits to tradeoffs between resource usage and correctness.

ASSOC COMPUTING MACHINERY2020

A sieve algorithm based on overlattices

Anja Annemone Becker

In this paper, we present a heuristic algorithm for solving exact, as well as approximate, shortest vector and closest vector problems on lattices. The algorithm can be seen as a modified sieving algorithm for which the vectors of the intermediate sets lie in overlattices or translated cosets of overlattices. The key idea is hence no longer to work with a single lattice but to move the problems around in a tower of related lattices. We initiate the algorithm by sampling very short vectors in an overlattice of the original lattice that admits a quasi-orthonormal basis and hence an efficient enumeration of vectors of bounded norm. Taking sums of vectors in the sample, we construct short vectors in the next lattice. Finally, we obtain solution vector(s) in the initial lattice as a sum of vectors of an overlattice. The complexity analysis relies on the Gaussian heuristic. This heuristic is backed by experiments in low and high dimensions that closely reflect these estimates when solving hard lattice problems in the average case. This new approach allows us to solve not only shortest vector problems, but also closest vector problems, in lattices of dimension n in time 2(0.3774n) using memory 2(0.2925n). Moreover, the algorithm is straightforward to parallelize on most computer architectures.

Cambridge Univ Press2014

An Architecture-Independent Instruction Shuffler to Protect against Side-Channel Attacks

Ali Galip Bayrak, Paolo Ienne, Nikola Velickovic

Embedded cryptographic systems, such as smart cards, require secure implementations that are robust to a variety of low-level attacks. Side-Channel Attacks (SCA) exploit the information such as power consumption, electromagnetic radiation and acoustic leaking through the device to uncover the secret information. Attackers can mount successful attacks with very modest resources in a short time period. Therefore, many methods have been proposed to increase the security against SCA. Randomizing the execution order of the instructions that are independent, i.e., random shuffling, is one of the most popular among them. Implementing instruction shuffling in software is either implementation specific or has a significant performance or code size overhead. To overcome these problems, we propose in this work a generic custom hardware unit to implement random instruction shuffling as an extension to existing processors. The unit operates between the CPU and the instruction cache (or memory, if no cache exists), without any modification to these components. Both true and pseudo random number generators are used to dynamically and locally provide the shuffling sequence. The unit is mainly designed for in-order processors, since the embedded devices subject to these kind of attacks use simple in-order processors. More advanced processors (e.g., superscalar, VLIW or EPIC processors) are already more resistant to these attacks because of their built-in ILP and wide word size. Our experiments on two different soft in-order processor cores, i.e., OpenRISC and MicroBlaze, implemented on FPGA show that the proposed unit could increase the security drastically with very modest resource overhead. With around 2% area, 1.5% power and no performance overhead, the shuffler increases the effort to mount a successful power analysis attack on AES software implementation over 360 times.

2012

An Architecture-Independent Instruction Shuffler to Protect against Side-Channel Attacks

Ali Galip Bayrak, Paolo Ienne, Nikola Velickovic

2012