Logical equivalenceIn logic and mathematics, statements and are said to be logically equivalent if they have the same truth value in every model. The logical equivalence of and is sometimes expressed as , , , or , depending on the notation being used. However, these symbols are also used for material equivalence, so proper interpretation would depend on the context. Logical equivalence is different from material equivalence, although the two concepts are intrinsically related. In logic, many common logical equivalences exist and are often listed as laws or properties.
Algebraic semantics (mathematical logic)In mathematical logic, algebraic semantics is a formal semantics based on algebras studied as part of algebraic logic. For example, the modal logic S4 is characterized by the class of topological boolean algebras—that is, boolean algebras with an interior operator. Other modal logics are characterized by various other algebras with operators. The class of boolean algebras characterizes classical propositional logic, and the class of Heyting algebras propositional intuitionistic logic.
Degree of truthIn classical logic, propositions are typically unambiguously considered as being true or false. For instance, the proposition one is both equal and not equal to itself is regarded as simply false, being contrary to the Law of Noncontradiction; while the proposition one is equal to one is regarded as simply true, by the Law of Identity. However, some mathematicians, computer scientists, and philosophers have been attracted to the idea that a proposition might be more or less true, rather than wholly true or wholly false.
Valuation (logic)In logic and model theory, a valuation can be: In propositional logic, an assignment of truth values to propositional variables, with a corresponding assignment of truth values to all propositional formulas with those variables. In first-order logic and higher-order logics, a structure, (the interpretation) and the corresponding assignment of a truth value to each sentence in the language for that structure (the valuation proper). The interpretation must be a homomorphism, while valuation is simply a function.
Boolean-valued functionA Boolean-valued function (sometimes called a predicate or a proposition) is a function of the type f : X → B, where X is an arbitrary set and where B is a Boolean domain, i.e. a generic two-element set, (for example B = {0, 1}), whose elements are interpreted as logical values, for example, 0 = false and 1 = true, i.e., a single bit of information. In the formal sciences, mathematics, mathematical logic, statistics, and their applied disciplines, a Boolean-valued function may also be referred to as a characteristic function, indicator function, predicate, or proposition.
Up tackThe up tack or falsum (⊥, \bot in LaTeX, U+22A5 in Unicode) is a constant symbol used to represent: The truth value 'false', or a logical constant denoting a proposition in logic that is always false (often called "falsum" or "absurdum"). The bottom element in wheel theory and lattice theory, which also represents absurdum when used for logical semantics The bottom type in type theory, which is the bottom element in the subtype relation.
Semantic theory of truthA semantic theory of truth is a theory of truth in the philosophy of language which holds that truth is a property of sentences. The semantic conception of truth, which is related in different ways to both the correspondence and deflationary conceptions, is due to work by Polish logician Alfred Tarski. Tarski, in "On the Concept of Truth in Formal Languages" (1935), attempted to formulate a new theory of truth in order to resolve the liar paradox.
T-schemaThe T-schema ("truth schema", not to be confused with "Convention T") is used to check if an inductive definition of truth is valid, which lies at the heart of any realisation of Alfred Tarski's semantic theory of truth. Some authors refer to it as the "Equivalence Schema", a synonym introduced by Michael Dummett. The T-schema is often expressed in natural language, but it can be formalized in many-sorted predicate logic or modal logic; such a formalisation is called a "T-theory.
Sorites paradoxThe sorites paradox (soʊ'raɪtiːz; sometimes known as the paradox of the heap) is a paradox that results from vague predicates. A typical formulation involves a heap of sand, from which grains are removed individually. With the assumption that removing a single grain does not cause a heap to become a non-heap, the paradox is to consider what happens when the process is repeated enough times that only one grain remains: is it still a heap? If not, when did it change from a heap to a non-heap? The word sorites (σωρείτης) derives from the Greek word for 'heap' (σωρός).
