Private finance initiative | EPFL Graph Search

The private finance initiative (PFI) was a United Kingdom government procurement policy aimed at creating "public–private partnerships" (PPPs) where private firms are contracted to complete and manage public projects. Initially launched in 1992 by Prime Minister John Major, and expanded considerably by the Blair government, PFI is part of the wider programme of privatisation and financialisation, and presented as a means for increasing accountability and efficiency for public spending. PFI was controversial in the UK. In 2003, the National Audit Office felt that it provided good value for money overall; according to critics, PFI has been used simply to place a great amount of debt "off-balance-sheet". In 2011, the parliamentary Treasury Select Committee recommended: "PFI should be brought on balance sheet. The Treasury should remove any perverse incentives unrelated to value for money by ensuring that PFI is not used to circumvent departmental budget limits. It should also ask the OB

Du savetier au financier: la famille Borel, de Neuchâtel à San Francisco

The Borel Family From Neuchâtel to San Francisco : From shoemaker to banker Did you know that the Cable Car was owned by Swiss citizens? BACKTRACKING : PRIVATE FINANCING OF PUBLIC METROPOLITAN INFRASTRUCTURES Executive Summary: Did you know that one of San Francisco most famous fixtures, the Cable car, was owned by Swiss citizens? Through this detailed study of the Borel family, and its business and investment plans we will observe an example of private financing of public metropolitan infrastructures in the 19th Century and see if it can teach us lessons for tomorrow’s needs? TOPICS Looking at today’s infrastructures, one does not always remember how much work contracting firms had to accomplish in order to produce our contemporary standard of urban comfort . What is to be said of yesterday’s planners or engineers and the credit they deserve? We often hear stories of local events brought to epic proportions, but who are the responsible players who really proved the feasibility of regional infrastructures? Who actually did support, sponsor or finance such achievements? The present study is a trial to propose a new view over such apparently hidden business phenomenons. This research shows us an inspiring case-study of local entrepreneurs who gather key success-factors. The author concentrates on the economic aspect of infrastructure financing to which modern metropolitan society owes its specific urban growth. Contemporary challenges such as job creation, globalisation, technology transfer and local economic development are all interconnected to metropolitan development. XIXTH CENTURY METROPOLITAN INFRASTRUCTURES FINANCING Le Temps, 30th July 1998, D. Masmejan : «Alfred Borel, Auguste’s elder son, enters the finance world. He meets an extraordinary businessman fate. His understanding of the economic impact of the Californian Gold Rush allows him to seize the opportunity of the westward American expansionism. He sails to San Francisco in 1855 where he is the founder of the «Alfred Borel & Company», followed in 1856 by a Mortgage fund (the “Caisse Hypothécaire” bank). The same year sees the foundation of Credit Suisse in Zurich. Alfred Borel investment bank participates in very important infrastructure projects in California and elsewhere in the second half of the XIXth century. At first, its investment into the worldwide famous San Francisco Cable Car is marginal and then becomes overwhelming. Other investments include the “Los Angeles Railway Company” or the “United Railroad Company”, the San Francisco Waterworks, other banks and real estate.» DETAILED RESEARCH ALLOWING TO UNDERSTAND FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING The author reviews financial decision-making through personal correspondence and private accounting in some of those completely documented yearly archives. The «sixth Switzerland» well-connected to the Presbyterian «Huguenot International» cosmopolitan network leads us to detailed research and discoveries. The accounting of 1866 to 1884 goes through the 3rd and 4th San Francisco City real estate crises that the mortgage bankers Borel brothers had to endure. Alfred Borel faced the 2nd Californian real estate crisis (which resulted from the first loss of public interest in gold mines in the years 1854-1858). Then he went back to Switzerland after the death of his father and uncles in order to reconstitute the Swiss end of the pipe connecting his bank’s investors to the Borel family network. He left duty of the day-to-day San Francisco business to his younger brother Antoine after having set up asset management rules. Together both brothers explored new ways of diversifying the investment of the funds they are managing and place them into infrastructures networks. Taking shares «upstream» into equipment industries (for instance the wire works delivering the precise traction rope of cable cars) or other real estate assets, allowed them to guarantee superior interests payments to European investors or creditors in comparison with other financial markets. This anticyclical economic strategy set up their financial success that occurred during the 5th local economic recession, which coincides with the beginning of the big worldwide Victorian economic crisis (1880-1895). UNIQUE SPECIFICITY OF THIS RESEARCH This research process is rarely accomplished in engineering and architecture schools, construction and infrastructures institutes or research centers. The integrity of construction professionals precludes their questioning « where does the whole process originate from?». Builders ultimately considered themselves as «honest craftsmen» that have to dedicate their energy and resources to the proper technical execution of the clients wishes and orders. Customers duty is then to write the project’s specifications and thus to initiate its process. The author of this case-study demonstrates the feasibility of comparisons between similar structural change periods in the XIXth century and the years 1990-2000. Hence, a new theme of interdisciplinary studies for engineers could be implemented by promoting this systemic approach between urban infrastructure financiers, suppliers and users. Last but not least, the insider observations and outsider revelations which are featured in this work are seldom considered in an engineering historical approach. It is not often that an author with a contemporary outsider vision has access to family archives that entirely document bicentennial confidential banker correspondence.

EPFL1999

What works and what doesn't with BOT contracts? The case of thermal and hydraulic plants

Nicolas Crettenand, Matthias Finger

Private financing and operations of public infrastructures – often also called Public-Private Partnerships or PPPs – are becoming increasingly important, especially in the case of developing countries. Different types of PPP instruments – among which in particular BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) and BOOT (Build-Own-Operate-Transfer) instruments – have been tried and will be used in major infrastructure projects, ranging from dams, power plants, roads, and railways to telecommunications infrastructures and others more. Little however is known about critical success factors. In this paper, the authors will focus on BOTs for both thermal and hydraulic plants. Empirically the paper will be grounded on selected cases in Africa, as well as on World Bank data. More precisely, the authors will compare such BOTs and seek to identify the relevant success factors. It is generally admitted that BOTs work better in the case of thermal plants than in the case of hydraulic plants. It is assumed that this is mainly because, in the case of thermal plants, more limited initial investment is needed and therefore less financial and other risks (e.g., climate, geology) are being incurred. However, there is generally more uncertainty about fuel price evolution in the case of thermal plants. The paper will seek to determine which are the relevant criteria that influence the choice for BOTs in either thermal and hydraulic plants. We anticipate that such criteria pertain to the amount of kWh needed, the type of energy needed (e.g., continuous vs peak-load), oil price, regulatory factors (e.g., CO2 tax), and others more. Overall, it will appear that risk management is the key to successful BOTs. Therefore, in conclusion, the paper will make related recommendations.

EPFL-CDM-MIR2005

Du savetier au financier: la famille Borel, de Neuchâtel à San Francisco

EPFL1999