Strategic votingStrategic voting, also called tactical voting, sophisticated voting or insincere voting, occurs in voting systems when a voter votes for a candidate or party other than their sincere preference to prevent an undesirable outcome. For example, in a simple plurality election, a voter might gain a better outcome by voting for a less preferred but more generally popular candidate. Gibbard's theorem shows that all single-winner voting methods encourage strategic voting, unless there are only two options or dictatorial (i.
Plurality votingPlurality voting refers to electoral systems in which a candidate(s), who poll more than any other counterpart (that is, receive a plurality), are elected. In systems based on single-member districts, it elects just one member per district and may also be referred to as first-past-the-post (FPTP), single-member plurality (SMP/SMDP), single-choice voting (an imprecise term as non-plurality voting systems may also use a single choice), simple plurality or relative majority (as opposed to an absolute majority, where more than half of votes is needed, this is called majority voting).
Arrow's impossibility theoremArrow's impossibility theorem, the general possibility theorem or Arrow's paradox is an impossibility theorem in social choice theory that states that when voters have three or more distinct alternatives (options), no ranked voting electoral system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals into a community-wide (complete and transitive) ranking while also meeting the specified set of criteria: unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency, and independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Two-round systemThe two-round system (TRS), also known as runoff voting, second ballot, or ballotage, is a voting method used to elect a single candidate, where voters cast a single vote for their preferred candidate. It generally ensures a majoritarian result, not a simple-plurality result as under first past the post. Under the two-round election system, the election process usually proceeds to a second round only if in the first round no candidate received a simple majority (more than 50%) of votes cast, or some other lower prescribed percentage.
Independence of irrelevant alternativesThe independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), also known as binary independence or the independence axiom, is an axiom of decision theory and various social sciences. The term is used in different connotation in several contexts. Although it always attempts to provide an account of rational individual behavior or aggregation of individual preferences, the exact formulation differs widely in both language and exact content. Perhaps the easiest way to understand the axiom is how it pertains to casting a ballot.
Cardinal votingCardinal voting refers to any electoral system which allows the voter to give each candidate an independent evaluation, typically a rating or grade. These are also referred to as "rated" (ratings ballot), "evaluative", "graded", or "absolute" voting systems. Cardinal methods (based on cardinal utility) and ordinal methods (based on ordinal utility) are two main categories of modern voting systems, along with plurality voting. There are several voting systems that allow independent ratings of each candidate.
Condorcet loser criterionIn single-winner voting system theory, the Condorcet loser criterion (CLC) is a measure for differentiating voting systems. It implies the majority loser criterion but does not imply the Condorcet winner criterion. A voting system complying with the Condorcet loser criterion will never allow a Condorcet loser to win. A Condorcet loser is a candidate who can be defeated in a head-to-head competition against each other candidate.
Participation criterionThe participation criterion is a voting system criterion. Voting systems that fail the participation criterion are said to exhibit the no show paradox and allow a particularly unusual strategy of tactical voting: abstaining from an election can help a voter's preferred choice win. The criterion has been defined as follows: In a deterministic framework, the participation criterion says that the addition of a ballot, where candidate A is strictly preferred to candidate B, to an existing tally of votes should not change the winner from candidate A to candidate B.
Gibbard's theoremIn the fields of mechanism design and social choice theory, Gibbard's theorem is a result proven by philosopher Allan Gibbard in 1973. It states that for any deterministic process of collective decision, at least one of the following three properties must hold: The process is dictatorial, i.e. there exists a distinguished agent who can impose the outcome; The process limits the possible outcomes to two options only; The process is open to strategic voting: once an agent has identified their preferences, it is possible that they have no action at their disposal that best defends these preferences irrespective of the other agents' actions.
Bullet votingBullet voting, also known as single-shot voting and plump voting, is a voting tactic, usually in multiple-winner elections, where a voter is entitled to vote for more than one candidate, but instead votes for only one candidate. A voter might do this because it is easier than evaluating all the candidates or as a form of tactical voting. Voters can use this tactic to maximize the chance that their favorite candidate will be elected while increasing the risk that other favored candidates will lose.
