Nanson's methodThe Borda count electoral system can be combined with an instant-runoff procedure to create hybrid election methods that are called Nanson method and Baldwin method (also called Total Vote Runoff or TVR). Both methods are designed to satisfy the Condorcet criterion, and allow for incomplete ballots and equal rankings. The Nanson method is based on the original work of the mathematician Edward J. Nanson in 1882.
Comparison of electoral systemsComparison of electoral systems is the result of comparative politics for electoral systems. Electoral systems are the rules for conducting elections, a main component of which is the algorithm for determining the winner (or several winners) from the ballots cast. This article discusses methods and results of comparing different electoral systems, both those that elect a unique candidate in a 'single-winner' election and those that elect a group of representatives in a multiwinner election.
Condorcet winner criterionAn electoral system satisfies the Condorcet winner criterion (pronkɒndɔrˈseɪ) if it always chooses the Condorcet winner when one exists. The candidate who wins a majority of the vote in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates - that is, a candidate preferred by more voters than any others - is the Condorcet winner, although Condorcet winners do not exist in all cases. It is sometimes simply referred to as the "Condorcet criterion", though it is very different from the "Condorcet loser criterion".
Approval votingApproval voting is an electoral system in which voters can select many candidates instead of selecting only one candidate. Approval voting ballots show a list of all the candidates running and each voter indicates support for as many candidates as they see fit. Final tallies show how many votes each candidate received, and the winner is the candidate with the most support. Approval voting advocates Steven Brams and Dudley R. Herschbach predict that Approval should increase voter participation, prevent minor-party candidates from being spoilers, and reduce negative campaigning.
Monotonicity criterionThe monotonicity criterion is a voting system criterion used to evaluate both single and multiple winner ranked voting systems. A ranked voting system is monotonic if it is neither possible to prevent the election of a candidate by ranking them higher on some of the ballots, nor possible to elect an otherwise unelected candidate by ranking them lower on some of the ballots (while nothing else is altered on any ballot). That is to say, in single winner elections no winner is harmed by up-ranking and no loser is helped by down-ranking.
Condorcet methodA Condorcet method (pronkɒndɔrˈseɪ; kɔ̃dɔʁsɛ) is an election method that elects the candidate who wins a majority of the vote in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates, that is, a candidate preferred by more voters than any others, whenever there is such a candidate. A candidate with this property, the pairwise champion or beats-all winner, is formally called the Condorcet winner. The head-to-head elections need not be done separately; a voter's choice within any given pair can be determined from the ranking.
Arrow's impossibility theoremArrow's impossibility theorem, the general possibility theorem or Arrow's paradox is an impossibility theorem in social choice theory that states that when voters have three or more distinct alternatives (options), no ranked voting electoral system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals into a community-wide (complete and transitive) ranking while also meeting the specified set of criteria: unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency, and independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Mutual majority criterionThe mutual majority criterion is a criterion used to compare voting systems. It is also known as the majority criterion for solid coalitions and the generalized majority criterion. The criterion states that if there is a subset S of the candidates, such that more than half of the voters strictly prefer every member of S to every candidate outside of S, this majority voting sincerely, the winner must come from S. This is similar to but stricter than the majority criterion, where the requirement applies only to the case that S contains a single candidate.
Condorcet loser criterionIn single-winner voting system theory, the Condorcet loser criterion (CLC) is a measure for differentiating voting systems. It implies the majority loser criterion but does not imply the Condorcet winner criterion. A voting system complying with the Condorcet loser criterion will never allow a Condorcet loser to win. A Condorcet loser is a candidate who can be defeated in a head-to-head competition against each other candidate.
Independence of irrelevant alternativesThe independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), also known as binary independence or the independence axiom, is an axiom of decision theory and various social sciences. The term is used in different connotation in several contexts. Although it always attempts to provide an account of rational individual behavior or aggregation of individual preferences, the exact formulation differs widely in both language and exact content. Perhaps the easiest way to understand the axiom is how it pertains to casting a ballot.
