Condorcet loser criterionIn single-winner voting system theory, the Condorcet loser criterion (CLC) is a measure for differentiating voting systems. It implies the majority loser criterion but does not imply the Condorcet winner criterion. A voting system complying with the Condorcet loser criterion will never allow a Condorcet loser to win. A Condorcet loser is a candidate who can be defeated in a head-to-head competition against each other candidate.
Monotonicity criterionThe monotonicity criterion is a voting system criterion used to evaluate both single and multiple winner ranked voting systems. A ranked voting system is monotonic if it is neither possible to prevent the election of a candidate by ranking them higher on some of the ballots, nor possible to elect an otherwise unelected candidate by ranking them lower on some of the ballots (while nothing else is altered on any ballot). That is to say, in single winner elections no winner is harmed by up-ranking and no loser is helped by down-ranking.
Score votingScore voting or range voting is an electoral system for single-seat elections, in which voters give each candidate a score, the scores are added (or averaged), and the candidate with the highest total is elected. It has been described by various other names including evaluative voting, utilitarian voting, interval measure voting, the point system, ratings summation, 0-99 voting, average voting and utility voting. It is a type of cardinal voting electoral system, and aims to implement the utilitarian social choice rule.
Plurality block votingPlurality block voting, also known as plurality-at-large voting, bloc vote or block voting (BV) is a non-proportional voting system for electing representatives in multi-winner elections. Each voter may cast as many votes as the number of seats to be filled. The usual result when the candidates divide into parties is that the most popular party in the district sees its full slate of candidates elected in a seemingly landslide victory.
Condorcet winner criterionAn electoral system satisfies the Condorcet winner criterion (pronkɒndɔrˈseɪ) if it always chooses the Condorcet winner when one exists. The candidate who wins a majority of the vote in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates - that is, a candidate preferred by more voters than any others - is the Condorcet winner, although Condorcet winners do not exist in all cases. It is sometimes simply referred to as the "Condorcet criterion", though it is very different from the "Condorcet loser criterion".
Independence of irrelevant alternativesThe independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), also known as binary independence or the independence axiom, is an axiom of decision theory and various social sciences. The term is used in different connotation in several contexts. Although it always attempts to provide an account of rational individual behavior or aggregation of individual preferences, the exact formulation differs widely in both language and exact content. Perhaps the easiest way to understand the axiom is how it pertains to casting a ballot.
