Concept

Impossible world

Summary
In philosophical logic, the concept of an impossible world (sometimes called a non-normal world) is used to model certain phenomena that cannot be adequately handled using ordinary possible worlds. An impossible world, , is the same sort of thing as a possible world (whatever that may be), except that it is in some sense "impossible." Depending on the context, this may mean that some contradictions, statements of the form are true at , or that the normal laws of logic, metaphysics, and mathematics, fail to hold at , or both. Impossible worlds are controversial objects in philosophy, logic, and semantics. They have been around since the advent of possible world semantics for modal logic, as well as world based semantics for non-classical logics, but have yet to find the ubiquitous acceptance, that their possible counterparts have found in all walks of philosophy. Possible worlds are often regarded with suspicion, which is why their proponents have struggled to find arguments in their favor. An often-cited argument is called the argument from ways. It defines possible worlds as "ways how things could have been" and relies for its premises and inferences on assumptions from natural language, for example: (1) Hillary Clinton could have won the 2016 US election. (2) So there are other ways how things could have been. (3) Possible worlds are ways how things could have been. (4) So there are other possible worlds. The central step of this argument happens at (2) where the plausible (1) is interpreted in a way that involves quantification over "ways". Many philosophers, following Willard Van Orman Quine, hold that quantification entails ontological commitments, in this case, a commitment to the existence of possible worlds. Quine himself restricted his method to scientific theories, but others have applied it also to natural language, for example, Amie L. Thomasson in her paper entitled Ontology Made Easy. The strength of the argument from ways depends on these assumptions and may be challenged by casting doubt on the quantifier-method of ontology or on the reliability of natural language as a guide to ontology.
About this result
This page is automatically generated and may contain information that is not correct, complete, up-to-date, or relevant to your search query. The same applies to every other page on this website. Please make sure to verify the information with EPFL's official sources.
Related publications (2)

A Probabilistic Measure of Modality Reliability in Speaker Verification

Jonas Richiardi, Andrzej Drygajlo, Plamen Prodanov

In this paper, a probabilistic measure for reliability of speaker verification under noisy acoustic conditions is proposed. A Bayesian network is used to estimate a probability for verification errors, given the GMM-based speaker verification system output ...
IEEE2005

A Probabilistic Measure of Modality Reliability in Speaker Verification

In this paper, a probabilistic measure for reliability of speaker verification under noisy acoustic conditions is proposed. A Bayesian network is used to estimate a probability for verification errors, given the GMM-based speaker verification system output ...
2005
Related concepts (2)
Modal realism
Modal realism is the view propounded by philosopher David Lewis that all possible worlds are real in the same way as is the actual world: they are "of a kind with this world of ours." It is based on four tenets: possible worlds exist, possible worlds are not different in kind from the actual world, possible worlds are irreducible entities, and the term actual in actual world is indexical, i.e. any subject can declare their world to be the actual one, much as they label the place they are "here" and the time they are "now".
Possible world
A possible world is a complete and consistent way the world is or could have been. Possible worlds are widely used as a formal device in logic, philosophy, and linguistics in order to provide a semantics for intensional and modal logic. Their metaphysical status has been a subject of controversy in philosophy, with modal realists such as David Lewis arguing that they are literally existing alternate realities, and others such as Robert Stalnaker arguing that they are not.