Concept
Nash equilibrium
Related concepts (37)
Brouwer fixed-point theorem
Brouwer's fixed-point theorem is a fixed-point theorem in topology, named after L. E. J. (Bertus) Brouwer. It states that for any continuous function mapping a nonempty compact convex set to itself there is a point such that . The simplest forms of Brouwer's theorem are for continuous functions from a closed interval in the real numbers to itself or from a closed disk to itself. A more general form than the latter is for continuous functions from a nonempty convex compact subset of Euclidean space to itself.
Coordination game
A coordination game is a type of simultaneous game found in game theory. It describes the situation where a player will earn a higher payoff when they select the same course of action as another player. The game is not one of pure conflict, which results in multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria in which players choose matching strategies. Figure 1 shows a 2-player example.
Complete information
In economics and game theory, complete information is an economic situation or game in which knowledge about other market participants or players is available to all participants. The utility functions (including risk aversion), payoffs, strategies and "types" of players are thus common knowledge. Complete information is the concept that each player in the game is aware of the sequence, strategies, and payoffs throughout gameplay.
Antoine Augustin Cournot
Antoine Augustin Cournot (ɑ̃twan oɡystɛ̃ kuʁno; 28 August 1801 - 31 March 1877) was a French philosopher and mathematician who also contributed to the development of economics. Antoine Augustin Cournot was born at Gray, Haute-Saône. In 1821 he entered one of the most prestigious Grandes Écoles, the École Normale Supérieure, and, according to Sandmo: in 1823 he took a license degree in mathematics at Sorbonne University. He then became the private secretary of a field marshal who required assistance in writing his memoirs.
Set-valued function
A set-valued function (or correspondence) is a mathematical function that maps elements from one set, the domain of the function, to subsets of another set. Set-valued functions are used in a variety of mathematical fields, including optimization, control theory and game theory. Set-valued functions are also known as multivalued functions in some references, but herein and in many others references in mathematical analysis, a multivalued function is a set-valued function f that has a further continuity property, namely that the choice of an element in the set defines a corresponding element in each set for y close to x, and thus defines locally an ordinary function.
Stackelberg competition
The Stackelberg leadership model is a strategic game in economics in which the leader firm moves first and then the follower firms move sequentially (hence, it is sometimes described as the "leader-follower game"). It is named after the German economist Heinrich Freiherr von Stackelberg who published Marktform und Gleichgewicht [Market Structure and Equilibrium] in 1934, which described the model. In game theory terms, the players of this game are a leader and a follower and they compete on quantity.
Non-credible threat
A non-credible threat is a term used in game theory and economics to describe a threat in a sequential game that a rational player would not actually carry out, because it would not be in his best interest to do so. A threat, and its counterpart - a commitment, are both defined by American economist and Nobel prize winner, T.C. Schelling, who stated that: "A announces that B's behaviour will lead to a response from A. If this response is a reward, then the announcement is a commitment; if this response is a penalty, then the announcement is a threat.
Tit for tat
Tit for tat is an English saying meaning "equivalent retaliation". It developed from "tip for tap", first recorded in 1558. It is also a highly effective strategy in game theory. An agent using this strategy will first cooperate, then subsequently replicate an opponent's previous action. If the opponent previously was cooperative, the agent is cooperative. If not, the agent is not. Tit-for-tat has been very successfully used as a strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma.
Repeated game
In game theory, a repeated game is an extensive form game that consists of a number of repetitions of some base game (called a stage game). The stage game is usually one of the well-studied 2-person games. Repeated games capture the idea that a player will have to take into account the impact of their current action on the future actions of other players; this impact is sometimes called their reputation. Single stage game or single shot game are names for non-repeated games.
Correlated equilibrium
In game theory, a correlated equilibrium is a solution concept that is more general than the well known Nash equilibrium. It was first discussed by mathematician Robert Aumann in 1974. The idea is that each player chooses their action according to their private observation of the value of the same public signal. A strategy assigns an action to every possible observation a player can make. If no player would want to deviate from their strategy (assuming the others also don't deviate), the distribution from which the signals are drawn is called a correlated equilibrium.