Function pointer

Summary

A function pointer, also called a subroutine pointer or procedure pointer, is a pointer referencing executable code, rather than data. Dereferencing the function pointer yields the referenced function, which can be invoked and passed arguments just as in a normal function call. Such an invocation is also known as an "indirect" call, because the function is being invoked indirectly through a variable instead of directly through a fixed identifier or address. Function pointers allow different code to be executed at runtime. They can also be passed to a function to enable callbacks. Function pointers are supported by third-generation programming languages (such as PL/I, COBOL, Fortran, dBASE dBL, and C) and object-oriented programming languages (such as C++, C#, and D). Simple function pointers The simplest implementation of a function (or subroutine) pointer is as a variable containing the address of the function within executable memory. Older third-generation languages suc

Official source

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Function_pointer

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Object-Oriented Recovery for Non-volatile Memory

David Teksen Aksun, Nachshon Cohen, James Richard Larus

New non-volatile memory (NVM) technologies enable direct, durable storage of data in an application's heap. Durable, randomly accessible memory facilitates the construction of applications that do not lose data at system shutdown or power failure. Existing NVM programming frameworks provide mechanisms to consistently capture a running application's state. They do not, however, fully support object-oriented languages or ensure that the persistent heap is consistent with the environment when the application is restarted. In this paper, we propose a new NVM language extension and runtime system that supports object-oriented NVM programming and avoids the pitfalls of prior approaches. At the heart of our technique is \emph{object reconstruction}, which transparently restores and reconstructs a persistent object's state during program restart. It is implemented in NVMReconstruction, a Clang/LLVM extension and runtime library that provides: (i) transient fields in persistent objects, (ii) support for virtual functions and function pointers, (iii) direct representation of persistent pointers as virtual addresses, and (iv) type-specific reconstruction of a persistent object during program restart. In addition, NVMReconstruction supports updating an application's code, even if this causes objects to expand, by providing object migration. NVMReconstruction also can compact the persistent heap to reduce fragmentation. In experiments, we demonstrate the versatility and usability of object reconstruction and its low runtime performance cost.

ACM2018

Code-Pointer Integrity

George Candea, Volodymyr Kuznetsov, Mathias Josef Payer

Systems code is often written in low-level languages like C/C++, which offer many benefits but also delegate memory management to programmers. This invites memory safety bugs that attackers can exploit to divert control flow and compromise the system. Deployed defense mechanisms (e.g., ASLR, DEP) are incomplete, and stronger defense mechanisms (e.g., CFI) often have high overhead and limited guarantees [19, 15, 9]. We introduce code-pointer integrity (CPI), a new design point that guarantees the integrity of all code pointers in a program (e.g., function pointers, saved return addresses) and thereby prevents all control-flow hijack attacks, including return-oriented programming. We also introduce code-pointer separation (CPS), a relaxation of CPI with better performance properties. CPI and CPS offer substantially better security-to-overhead ratios than the state of the art, they are practical (we protect a complete FreeBSD system and over 100 packages like apache and postgresql), effective (prevent all attacks in the RIPE benchmark), and efficient: on SPEC CPU2006, CPS averages 1.2% overhead for C and 1.9% for C/C++, while CPI’s overhead is 2.9% for C and 8.4% for C/C++. A prototype implementation of CPI and CPS can be obtained from http://levee.epfl.ch.

2014

Control-Flow Hijacking attacks are the dominant attack vector against C/C++ programs. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) solutions mitigate these attacks on the forward edge, i.e., indirect calls through function pointers and virtual calls. Protecting the backward edge is left to stack canaries, which are easily bypassed through information leaks. Shadow Stacks are a fully precise mechanism for protecting backwards edges, and should be deployed with CFI mitigations. We present a comprehensive analysis of all possible shadow stack mechanisms along three axes: performance, compatibility, and security. For performance comparisons we use SPEC CPU2006, while security and compatibility are qualitatively analyzed. Based on our study, we renew calls for a shadow stack design that leverages a dedicated register, resulting in low performance overhead, and minimal memory overhead, but sacrifices compatibility. We present case studies of our implementation of such a design, Shadesmar, on Phoronix and Apache to demonstrate the feasibility of dedicating a general purpose register to a security monitor on modern architectures, and Shadesmar's deployability. Our comprehensive analysis, including detailed case studies for our novel design, allows compiler designers and practitioners to select the correct shadow stack design for different usage scenarios. Shadow stacks belong to the class of defense mechanisms that require metadata about the program's state to enforce their defense policies. Protecting this metadata for deployed mitigations requires in-process isolation of a segment of the virtual address space. Prior work on defenses in this class has relied on information hiding to protect metadata. We show that stronger guarantees are possible by repurposing two new Intel x86 extensions for memory protection (MPX), and page table control (MPK). Building on our isolation efforts with MPX and MPK, we present the design requirements for a dedicated hardware mechanism to support intra-process memory isolation, and discuss how such a mechanism can empower the next wave of highly precise software security mitigations that rely on partially isolated information in a process.

IEEE COMPUTER SOC2019