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Concept
Operation Ostra Brama
Summary
Operation Ostra Brama (lit. Operation Gate of Dawn) was an attempt by the Polish Home Army to take over Vilnius (Wilno) from Nazi Germany's evacuating troops ahead of the approaching Soviet Vilnius Offensive. A part of a Polish national uprising, Operation Tempest, the action began on 7 July 1944 and lasted until 14 July 1944.
The main reason for the operation was for propaganda purposes – to claim full rights to Vilnius by retaking it before the Soviet Red Army arrived. The operation did not achieve its objectives.
On 12 June 1944 General Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski, Commander-in-Chief of the Home Army, issued an order to prepare a plan of seizing Vilnius from German hands. The Home Army districts of Vilnius and Navahrudak planned to take control of the city before the Soviets could reach it. The Commander of the Home Army District in Vilnius, lieutenant colonel Aleksander Krzyżanowski, decided to regroup all the partisan units in the northeastern part of Poland for the assault, both from inside and outside of the city.
Operation Ostra Brama was meant to be carried out during an expected state of confusion among German units in Vilnius (Wilno), faced with the impending arrival of major Soviet forces. The Germans held strong positions in the fortified city. On 26 June 1944 major Teodor "Slaw" Cetys and lieutenant colonel Zygmunt "Strychański" Blumski suggested a plan to Krzyżanowski. 'Ostra Brama order number 1' comprised an overall outline for an assault on Vilnius, where the Home Army forces of the combined districts Vilnius and Navahrudak would strike from the outside under the lead of lieutenant colonel Poleszczuk.
Units inside the city were under the command of lieutenant colonel "Ludwik". According to the plan, the main attack was prepared from the east and southeast on 8 July. When the Red Army crossed the front, equivalent to where it was in 1916 (between Soly and Smarhon’), the uprising would begin.
Because the Soviet Red Army was approaching the city faster than expected, Krzyżanowski made the decision to launch the operation one day sooner.
Official source
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