Concept

Message authentication code

Related publications (84)

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A Formally Verified NAT Stack

George Candea, Solal Vincenzo Pirelli, Arseniy Zaostrovnykh

Prior work proved a stateful NAT network function to be semantically correct, crash-free, and memory safe. Their toolchain verifies the network function code while assuming the underlying kernel-bypass framework, drivers, operating system, and hardware to ...

2018

A Formally Verified NAT Stack

George Candea, Solal Vincenzo Pirelli, Arseniy Zaostrovnykh

Prior work proved a stateful NAT network function to be, crash-free, memory safe and semantically correct [29]. Their toolchain verifies the network function code while assuming the underlying kernel-bypass framework, drivers, operating system, and hardwar ...

ASSOC COMPUTING MACHINERY2018

Linking Online Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption and Blockwise Attack Models

Damian Vizár

Real-world applications of authenticated encryption often require the encryption to be computable online, e.g. to compute the ith block of ciphertext after having processed the first i blocks of plaintext. A significant line of research was dedicated to id ...

2017

Clever Arbiters Versus Malicious Adversaries

Serge Vaudenay

When moving from known-input security to chosen-input security, some generic attacks sometimes become possible and must be discarded by a specific set of rules in the threat model. Similarly, common practices consist of fixing security systems, once an exp ...

Springer Berlin Heidelberg2016

Signature Schemes Secure Against Hard-to-Invert Leakage

Sebastian Faust

Side-channel attacks allow the adversary to gain partial knowledge of the secret key when cryptographic protocols are implemented in real-world hardware. The goal of leakage resilient cryptography is to design cryptosystems that withstand such attacks. In ...

Springer2016

Revisiting the Sanders-Bogolyubov-Ruzsa Theorem in F-p(n) and its Application to Non-malleable Codes

Divesh Aggarwal

Non-malleable codes (NMCs) protect sensitive data against degrees of corruption that prohibit error detection, ensuring instead that a corrupted codeword decodes correctly or to something that bears little relation to the original message. The split-state ...

Ieee2016

Security of Full-State Keyed Sponge and Duplex: Applications to Authenticated Encryption

Damian Vizár, Reza Reyhanitabar

We provide a security analysis for full-state keyed Sponge and full-state Duplex constructions. Our results can be used for making a large class of Sponge-based authenticated encryption schemes more efficient by concurrent absorption of associated data and ...

Springer2015

Efficient Recursive Diffusion Layers for Block Ciphers, and Hash Functions

Pouyan Sepehrdad

Many modern block ciphers use maximum distance separable (MDS) matrices as the main part of their diffusion layers. In this paper, we propose a very efficient new class of diffusion layers constructed from several rounds of Feistel-like structures whose ro ...

Springer2015

Secure Network Coding With Erasures and Feedback

Christina Fragouli, Suhas Diggavi, László Czap, Vinod Malathidevi Prabhakaran

Secure network coding assumes that the underlying network channels are error-free; thus, if our channels introduce errors, we need to first apply a channel code to correct them, and then build security on top of the resulting error-free network. In this pa ...

Ieee-Inst Electrical Electronics Engineers Inc2015

Non-malleable Reductions and Applications

Divesh Aggarwal

Non-malleable codes, introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs [DPW10], provide a useful message integrity guarantee in situations where traditional error-correction (and even error-detection) is impossible; for example, when the attacker can completel ...

ACM2015