Network security

Summary

Network security consists of the policies, processes and practices adopted to prevent, detect and monitor unauthorized access, misuse, modification, or denial of a computer network and network-accessible resources. Network security involves the authorization of access to data in a network, which is controlled by the network administrator. Users choose or are assigned an ID and password or other authenticating information that allows them access to information and programs within their authority. Network security covers a variety of computer networks, both public and private, that are used in everyday jobs: conducting transactions and communications among businesses, government agencies and individuals. Networks can be private, such as within a company, and others which might be open to public access. Network security is involved in organizations, enterprises, and other types of institutions. It does as its title explains: it secures the network, as well as protecting and overseeing ope

Official source

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_security

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Byzantine Failures and Security: Arbitrary is not (always) Random

Felix Gaertner

The Byzantine failure model allows arbitrary behavior of a certain fraction of network nodes in a distributed system. It was introduced to model and analyse the effects of very severe hardware faults in aircraft control systems. Lately, the Byzantine failure model has been used in the area of network security where Byzantine-tolerance is equated with resilience against malicious attackers. We discuss two reasons why one should be careful in doing so. Firstly, Byzantine-tolerance is not concerned with secrecy and so special means have to be employed if secrecy is a desired system property. Secondly, in contrast to the domain of hardware faults, in a security setting it is difficult to compute the assumption coverage of the Byzantine failure model, i.e., the probability that the failure assumption holds in practice. For this latter point we develop a methodology which allows to estimate the reliability of a Byzantine-tolerant solution exposed to attackers of different strengths.

2003

On Trust Models and Trust Evaluation Metrics for Ad-Hoc Networks

Georgios Theodorakopoulos

Within the realm of network security, we interpret the concept of trust as a relation among entities that participate in various protocols. Trust relations are based on evidence created by the previous interactions of entities within a protocol. In this work, we are focusing on the evaluation of trust evidence in ad hoc networks. Because of the dynamic nature of ad hoc networks, trust evidence may be uncertain and incomplete. Also, no preestablished infrastructure can be assumed. The evaluation process is modeled as a path problem on a directed graph, where nodes represent entities, and edges represent trust relations. We give intuitive requirements and discuss design issues for any trust evaluation algorithm. Using the theory of semirings, we show how two nodes can establish an indirect trust relation without previous direct interaction. We show that our semiring framework is flexible enough to express other trust models, most notably PGP's Web of Trust. Our scheme is shown to be robust in the presence of attackers.

2006

An important concept in network security is trust, interpreted as a relation among entities that participate in various protocols. Trust relations are based on evidence related to the previous interactions of entities within a protocol. In this work, we are focusing on the evaluation process of trust evidence in Ad Hoc Networks. Because of the dynamic nature of Ad Hoc Networks, trust evidence may be uncertain and incomplete. Also, no pre-established infrastructure can be assumed. The process is formulated as a path problem on a directed graph, where nodes represent entities, and edges represent trust relations. Using the theory of semirings, we show how two nodes can establish an indirect trust relation without previous direct interaction. The results are robust in the presence of attackers. We give intuitive requirements for any trust evaluation algorithm. The performance of the scheme is evaluated on three topologies.

ACM Press2004