Liquidity trap | EPFL Graph Search

A liquidity trap is a situation, described in Keynesian economics, in which, "after the rate of interest has fallen to a certain level, liquidity preference may become virtually absolute in the sense that almost everyone prefers holding cash rather than holding a debt (financial instrument) which yields so low a rate of interest." A liquidity trap is caused when people hold cash because they expect an adverse event such as deflation, insufficient aggregate demand, or war. Among the characteristics of a liquidity trap are interest rates that are close to zero and changes in the money supply that fail to translate into changes in the price level. John Maynard Keynes, in his 1936 General Theory, wrote the following: There is the possibility...that, after the rate of interest has fallen to a certain level, liquidity-preference may become virtually absolute in the sense that almost everyone prefers cash to holding a debt which yields so low a rate of interest. In this event the monetary authority would have lost effective control over the rate of interest. But whilst this limiting case might become practically important in future, I know of no example of it hitherto. This concept of monetary policy's potential impotence was further worked out in the works of British economist John Hicks, who published the IS–LM model representing Keynes's system. Nobel laureate Paul Krugman, in his work on monetary policy, follows the formulations of Hicks: A liquidity trap may be defined as a situation in which conventional monetary policies have become impotent, because nominal interest rates are at or near zero: injecting monetary base into the economy has no effect, because [monetary] base and bonds are viewed by the private sector as perfect substitutes. In a liquidity trap, people are indifferent between bonds and cash because the rates of interest both financial instruments provide to their holder is practically equal: The interest on cash is zero and the interest on bonds is near-zero.

Informational frictions in financial markets

Erik Hapnes

This thesis consists of three chapters on informational frictions in financial markets. The chapters analyze problems related to markets' ability to guide real investment, and what drives liquidity. Both problems are important to ensure efficient resource allocation in the economy. The first chapter studies the interaction between financial markets and real investments. I develop a model that simultaneously study the equilibrium in financial markets, the choice of investors to produce information, and real decisions by the firm. The chapter provides a new method to overcome non-linearities in the security price, and the equilibrium is surprisingly simple. The results provide insights into when real investments have a substantial impact on market efficiency and when we can analyze equilibrium market efficiency separately. Equilibrium behavior may hide some inefficiencies from standard empirical tests. Some changes in financial markets may increase or have little effect on market efficiency, but reduce real efficiency by increasing the cost of information production. The second chapter analyzes time-variation in liquidity. I develop a tractable model where conditions among traders vary over time. The resulting equilibrium offers several new predictions on what drives liquidity variation. For example, there may be significant reductions in liquidity from even tiny changes among the traders' conditions. Strategic behavior drives the results, and the model explains how liquidity may suddenly evaporate without a clear cause. Empirical results are in line with the predictions of the model. Surprisingly, everyone may benefit from sometimes restricting some traders from the market. Doing so can reallocate liquidity to periods with more significant liquidity needs. The third chapter studies the choice of anonymity among traders. All traders end up revealing their identity unless doing so is costly, or the order flow is noisy. The intuition is that there is always at least one trader who prefers to reveal his or her identity. If the order flow is noisy, then there is a threshold type, and more patient traders stay anonymous. The results suggest that a fully anonymous market is most efficient, but the gains from anonymity are distributed unevenly. This result explains why different markets vary significantly in choices related to anonymity.

EPFL2021

Essays in Financial Economics

Kornelia Fabisik

This thesis consists of three parts that study separate subjects in corporate finance and corporate governance. The overarching theme is ownership by CEOs and other insiders. In the first part, which is co-authored work with Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, René M. Stulz, and Jerôme Taillard, we build the largest database of managerial ownership information ever used in the literature. We show that the empirical relation between a firm's Tobin's q and managerial ownership is systematically negative. When we restrict our sample to larger firms as in the prior literature, we confirm earlier findings of an increasing and concave relation between Tobin's q and managerial ownership. We show that cumulative past performance and liquidity can explain these seemingly contradictory results. Better performing firms have more liquid equity, which enables firms and insiders to more easily sell shares after the IPO, and they also have a higher Tobin's q. In the second part, I conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of the pledging phenomenon among U.S. CEOs. Pledging allows the owner of shares to put them up as collateral to a third party in exchange for cash. I show that between 2007 and 2016, 7.6% of publicly listed U.S. firms disclosed that their CEOs had pledged company stock as collateral for a loan. On average, CEOs pledge 38% of their shares. The mean loan value is an economically sizeable $65 million. CEOs use the funds to either double down (6.0%), hedge their ownership (3.5%), or to obtain liquidity while maintaining ownership (90.5%). My event study results reveal that stock market participants view pledging as value-enhancing. Similarly, I find no evidence of its negative shareholder value consequences, except for CEOs who engage in significant pledging. In the third part, I provide the first in-depth analysis of U.S. pledging CEOs who faced margin calls. A margin call occurs whenever the value of collateral backing a loan falls below a certain pre-specified amount. I find that 15% of CEOs with margin loans have at some point faced margin-call-induced selling. The mean (median) drop in CEO ownership following margin-call-induced sales is 31.2% (22.0%). More than 87% of firms do not introduce any type of an anti-pledging policy post margin-call sales by their CEOs which could explain the absence of any major changes in CEO compensation contracts. Corporate policies in firms with CEOs who lost a sizeable ownership stake are not indicative of weakened incentives.

EPFL2020

Market Structure and Transaction Costs of Index CDSs

Pierre Collin Dufresne, Jan Benjamin Junge

Despite regulatory efforts to promote all-to-all trading, the post-Dodd-Frank index credit default swap market remains two-tiered. Transaction costs are higher for dealer-to-client than interdealer trades, but the difference is explained by the higher, largely permanent, price impact of client trades. Most interdealer trades are liquidity motivated and executed via low-cost, low-immediacy trading protocols. Dealer-to-client trades are nonanonymous; they almost always improve upon contemporaneous executable interdealer quotes, and dealers appear to price discriminate based on the perceived price impact of trades. Our results suggest that the market structure is a consequence of the characteristics of client trades: relatively infrequent, large, and differentially informed.

WILEY2020