Concept

Principal–agent problem

Related publications (53)

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On the emergence of semantic agreement among rational agents

Karl Aberer

Today’s complex online applications often require the interaction of multiple (web) services that belong to potentially different business entities. Interoperability is a core element of such an environment, yet not a straightforward one due to the lack of ...

2015

Eliciting Truthful Information with the Peer Truth Serum

Boi Faltings, Radu Jurca, Goran Radanovic

We consider settings where a collective intelligence is formed by aggregating information contributed from many independent agents, such as product reviews, community sensing or opinion polls. To encourage participation and avoid selection bias, agents sho ...

2014

Decentralized Self-Selection of Swarm Trajectories: From Dynamical Systems to Robotic Implementation

Francesco Mondada, Max-Olivier Hongler, Guillaume Adrien Sartoretti, Marcelo Elias de Oliveira

In this paper, we present a distributed control strategy, enabling agents to converge onto and travel along a consensually selected curve among a class of closed planar curves. Individual agents identify the number of neighbors within a finite circular sen ...

Springer Verlag2014

Information percolation in segmented markets

Semyon Malamud, Darrell Duffie

We study equilibria of dynamic over-the-counter markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and offers. Investors differ with respect to information quality, including ini ...

Elsevier2014

Event risk, contingent claims and the temporal resolution of uncertainty

Pierre Collin Dufresne, Julien Hugonnier

We study the pricing and hedging of contingent claims that are subject to Event Risk which we define as rare and unpredictable events whose occurrence may be correlated to, but cannot be hedged perfectly with standard marketed instruments. The super-replic ...

Springer2014

Intermediation in a Sharing Economy: Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Rent Extraction

Thomas Alois Weber

Electronic intermediaries have become pervasive in sales transactions for many durables, such as cars, power tools, and apartments. Yet only recently have they successfully tackled the challenge of enabling parties to share such goods. A key impediment to ...

Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd2014

Incentive Mechanisms for Community Sensing

Boi Faltings, Radu Jurca, Jingshi Li

Sensing and monitoring of our natural environment are important for sustainability. As sensor systems grow to a large scale, it will become infeasible to place all sensors under centralized control. We investigate community sensing, where sensors are contr ...

Ieee Computer Soc2014

Symmetric Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Resource Allocation

Boi Faltings, Ludek Cigler

We analyze symmetric protocols to rationally coordinate on an asymmetric, efficient allocation in an infinitely repeated N-agent, C-resource allocation problems, where the resources are all homogeneous. Bhaskar proposed one way to achieve this in 2-agent, ...

AI Access Foundation2014

Multi-Agent Learning for Resource Allocation Problems

Ludek Cigler

We analyze resource allocation problems where N independent agents want to access C resources. Each resource can be only accessed by one agent at a time. In order to use the resources efficiently, the agents need to coordinate their access. We focus on dec ...

EPFL2013

Optimal incentives and securitization of defaultable assets

Semyon Malamud

We study optimal securitization in the presence of an initial moral hazard. A financial intermediary creates and then sells to outside investors defaultable assets, whose default risk is determined by the unobservable costly effort exerted by the intermedi ...

Elsevier2013