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Concept
Pramāṇa-samuccaya
Summary
The Pramāṇa-samuccaya (பிரமாண-சமுச்சயம்) is a philosophical treatise by Dignāga, an Indian Buddhist logician and epistemologist who lived from c. 480 to c. 540 . The work comprises an outline in the highly elliptical verse format typical of early Indian philosophical texts, and an explanatory auto-commentary.
Chapter 1
The treatise begins with Dignāga's assertion that there are only two means of knowledge: direct perception and inference. Corresponding to these, there are two objects: particulars and universals.Direct perception is knowledge which excludes conceptual thought (kalpanā). This only reveals the bare features of an object via the senses. This knowledge is inexpressible in words, relating to real objects and ultimate reality. Errors of perception arise through misinterpretations by conceptual thought. Each item of sense perception is unique. Dignāga does not specify what the nature of the object of perception is, but implies that although it is not atomic or otherwise, it is existent.
Chapter 2
The second chapter concerns the "inference for oneself" (). This is knowledge of what can be inferred through a middle term (), which has the three characteristics for a valid middle term, namely, that it is concomitantly present in the thesis, present in a similar example and absent from a dissimilar example. According to Dignāga, inference only deals with universals and is always dependent upon the subject/object relation.
Chapter 3
The subject of this chapter is the "inference for other" (), the process by which one makes public what one knows, by formal means, using a syllogistic means of argument. This typically takes the following form:
Chapter 4
Dignāga offers examples of how inferences are to be used and how to select relevant examples. In his method of syllogistic logic, agreeing and different examples are needed to establish concomitance of the middle term.
Chapter 5
Dignāga defines the "exclusion of other" (anyāpoha). Here, Dignāga first eliminates authority as a separate valid means of knowledge, stating that it is a kind of inference.
Official source
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