Summary
In cryptography, a preimage attack on cryptographic hash functions tries to find a message that has a specific hash value. A cryptographic hash function should resist attacks on its (set of possible inputs). In the context of attack, there are two types of preimage resistance: preimage resistance: for essentially all pre-specified outputs, it is computationally infeasible to find any input that hashes to that output; i.e., given , it is difficult to find an such that () = . second-preimage resistance: for a specified input, it is computationally infeasible to find another input which produces the same output; i.e., given , it is difficult to find a second input ′ ≠ such that () = (′). These can be compared with a collision resistance, in which it is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs , ′ that hash to the same output; i.e., such that () = (′). Collision resistance implies second-preimage resistance, but does not guarantee preimage resistance. Conversely, a second-preimage attack implies a collision attack (trivially, since, in addition to ′, is already known right from the start). By definition, an ideal hash function is such that the fastest way to compute a first or second preimage is through a brute-force attack. For an -bit hash, this attack has a time complexity 2^, which is considered too high for a typical output size of = 128 bits. If such complexity is the best that can be achieved by an adversary, then the hash function is considered preimage-resistant. However, there is a general result that quantum computers perform a structured preimage attack in , which also implies second preimage and thus a collision attack. Faster preimage attacks can be found by cryptanalysing certain hash functions, and are specific to that function. Some significant preimage attacks have already been discovered, but they are not yet practical. If a practical preimage attack is discovered, it would drastically affect many Internet protocols. In this case, "practical" means that it could be executed by an attacker with a reasonable amount of resources.
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