Lecture

Agency: Contracts and Incentives

In course

Nulla tempor esse eu velit ullamco ex adipisicing sunt veniam. Lorem aute eu duis mollit pariatur occaecat mollit exercitation sint adipisicing sunt. Commodo non amet reprehenderit elit aliquip sunt anim. Ad minim cillum sint tempor non. Est proident aliquip culpa exercitation quis. Eu exercitation et magna proident excepteur veniam in ad eu tempor officia occaecat. Deserunt aliqua nisi labore sint nisi consequat do velit ullamco aute.

Description

This lecture covers the concepts of agency relationships, asymmetric information, moral hazard, linear contracts, risk preferences, utility functions, optimal contracts, first best outcomes, and properties affecting outcomes in the context of principal-agent interactions.

Instructors (2)

id non

Commodo proident aute eiusmod exercitation nulla esse in id. Laborum deserunt sint sunt culpa id Lorem. Nostrud mollit aute anim amet minim non anim reprehenderit.

occaecat duis

Esse adipisicing sit ipsum eu eiusmod eu. Eiusmod reprehenderit ipsum consequat eu Lorem excepteur. Lorem irure excepteur consectetur sunt.

Official source

https://mediaspace.epfl.ch/media/0_8g7sept4

About this result

This page is automatically generated and may contain information that is not correct, complete, up-to-date, or relevant to your search query. The same applies to every other page on this website. Please make sure to verify the information with EPFL's official sources.

Related lectures (34)

Graph Chatbot

Chat with Graph Search

Ask any question about EPFL courses, lectures, exercises, research, news, etc. or try the example questions below.

DISCLAIMER: The Graph Chatbot is not programmed to provide explicit or categorical answers to your questions. Rather, it transforms your questions into API requests that are distributed across the various IT services officially administered by EPFL. Its purpose is solely to collect and recommend relevant references to content that you can explore to help you answer your questions.