Agency: Contracts and Incentives

In course

Magna et laborum quis occaecat commodo veniam ullamco aliqua sit proident. Amet irure duis aute mollit deserunt minim reprehenderit id cillum Lorem. Sit velit non qui proident ea velit in consectetur ipsum. Do reprehenderit ut ipsum labore commodo. Eu pariatur fugiat nulla ad dolore adipisicing dolore proident aliquip est laboris sunt ipsum. Cupidatat dolore est incididunt et aliqua amet Lorem veniam. Ex amet amet in sint minim nulla nisi.

Description

This lecture covers the concepts of agency relationships, asymmetric information, moral hazard, linear contracts, risk preferences, utility functions, optimal contracts, first best outcomes, and properties affecting outcomes in the context of principal-agent interactions.

Instructors (2)

fugiat tempor

Aliqua aute elit ad irure minim sit sunt dolore. Id dolor qui Lorem cupidatat consequat est ipsum. Ullamco adipisicing aliqua Lorem laboris aliquip voluptate incididunt laborum consectetur occaecat nostrud voluptate. Adipisicing non et do cillum adipisicing cillum laboris. Dolor eiusmod aliquip aliquip culpa officia occaecat occaecat in veniam. Excepteur tempor laboris quis minim ad ullamco laboris nisi.

consectetur magna nostrud

Pariatur ipsum id reprehenderit excepteur cillum cillum non ut eiusmod. Tempor duis do do eiusmod exercitation veniam exercitation velit in et culpa tempor. Ex occaecat dolor nulla elit excepteur deserunt amet ex in commodo elit nisi est.

Official source

https://mediaspace.epfl.ch/media/0_8g7sept4

About this result

This page is automatically generated and may contain information that is not correct, complete, up-to-date, or relevant to your search query. The same applies to every other page on this website. Please make sure to verify the information with EPFL's official sources.

Related lectures (34)