Auctions and Mechanism Design

In course

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Description

This lecture covers auctions, mechanisms, and social choice functions, focusing on topics such as bidding strategies, equilibrium bidding strategies, VCG mechanisms, and truthful mechanisms. It discusses various auction protocols, including English, Dutch, and Discriminatory auctions, as well as the implementation of social choice functions. The lecture also explores the challenges of truthful information extraction and the use of prediction markets.

Instructor

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Official source

https://mediaspace.epfl.ch/media/0_ivv2zagv

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Ontological neighbourhood

Information engineering

Natural language processing: Topics in natural language processing

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