DeterminacyDeterminacy is a subfield of set theory, a branch of mathematics, that examines the conditions under which one or the other player of a game has a winning strategy, and the consequences of the existence of such strategies. Alternatively and similarly, "determinacy" is the property of a game whereby such a strategy exists. Determinacy was introduced by Gale and Stewart in 1950, under the name "determinateness". The games studied in set theory are usually Gale–Stewart games—two-player games of perfect information in which the players make an infinite sequence of moves and there are no draws.
Perfect informationIn economics, perfect information (sometimes referred to as "no hidden information") is a feature of perfect competition. With perfect information in a market, all consumers and producers have complete and instantaneous knowledge of all market prices, their own utility, and own cost functions. In game theory, a sequential game has perfect information if each player, when making any decision, is perfectly informed of all the events that have previously occurred, including the "initialization event" of the game (e.
Imperfect competitionIn economics, imperfect competition refers to a situation where the characteristics of an economic market do not fulfil all the necessary conditions of a perfectly competitive market. Imperfect competition causes market inefficiencies, resulting in market failure. Imperfect competition usually describes behaviour of suppliers in a market, such that the level of competition between sellers is below the level of competition in perfectly competitive market conditions.
Universal setIn set theory, a universal set is a set which contains all objects, including itself. In set theory as usually formulated, it can be proven in multiple ways that a universal set does not exist. However, some non-standard variants of set theory include a universal set. Many set theories do not allow for the existence of a universal set. There are several different arguments for its non-existence, based on different choices of axioms for set theory. In Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, the axiom of regularity and axiom of pairing prevent any set from containing itself.
Bayesian gameIn game theory, a Bayesian game is a strategic decision-making model which assumes players have incomplete information. Players hold private information relevant to the game, meaning that the payoffs are not common knowledge. Bayesian games model the outcome of player interactions using aspects of Bayesian probability. They are notable because they allowed, for the first time in game theory, for the specification of the solutions to games with incomplete information. Hungarian economist John C.
Directed setIn mathematics, a directed set (or a directed preorder or a filtered set) is a nonempty set together with a reflexive and transitive binary relation (that is, a preorder), with the additional property that every pair of elements has an upper bound. In other words, for any and in there must exist in with and A directed set's preorder is called a direction. The notion defined above is sometimes called an . A is defined analogously, meaning that every pair of elements is bounded below.
Forcing (mathematics)In the mathematical discipline of set theory, forcing is a technique for proving consistency and independence results. Intuitively, forcing can be thought of as a technique to expand the set theoretical universe to a larger universe by introducing a new "generic" object . Forcing was first used by Paul Cohen in 1963, to prove the independence of the axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis from Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory.
Complete informationIn economics and game theory, complete information is an economic situation or game in which knowledge about other market participants or players is available to all participants. The utility functions (including risk aversion), payoffs, strategies and "types" of players are thus common knowledge. Complete information is the concept that each player in the game is aware of the sequence, strategies, and payoffs throughout gameplay.
Extensive-form gameIn game theory, an extensive-form game is a specification of a game allowing (as the name suggests) for the explicit representation of a number of key aspects, like the sequencing of players' possible moves, their choices at every decision point, the (possibly imperfect) information each player has about the other player's moves when they make a decision, and their payoffs for all possible game outcomes. Extensive-form games also allow for the representation of incomplete information in the form of chance events modeled as "moves by nature".
Axiom of choiceIn mathematics, the axiom of choice, abbreviated AC or AoC, is an axiom of set theory equivalent to the statement that a Cartesian product of a collection of non-empty sets is non-empty. Informally put, the axiom of choice says that given any collection of sets, each containing at least one element, it is possible to construct a new set by arbitrarily choosing one element from each set, even if the collection is infinite. Formally, it states that for every indexed family of nonempty sets, there exists an indexed set such that for every .
