Managing innovations resulting from university-industry collaborations

We consider a policy regime allowing academic institutions to grant industry the intellectual property rights (IPRs) over invention resulting from collaborations. If a firm plays an important role in generating an invention, the researcher offers the IPRs to the firm, as an incentive to collaborate. However, he retains certain domains where he can exploit an invention without having to apply for a license. The choice of these domains involves a tradeoff. In fact, the researcher either induces the firm's effort, by assigning a broad field of use, or he ensures that he can use an invention in other applications, by granting a narrow field of use. The reverse occurs if it is the researcher who plays an important role in generating an invention. The main difference, however, is that if effort were contractible, the firm could reward the researcher for supplying the first best level of effort, because, unlike the researcher, it is not cash constrained. An empirical analysis, based on École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne research contracts, supports the role of broad fields in bolstering a firm's effort, when the latter is important for generating an invention.

Three essays on university-industry technology transfer and the economics of science

Annamaria Conti

In the first chapter of this thesis, coauthored with Patrick Gaulé, we reexamine the widely held belief, known as the "European Paradox", that while European academic institutions are good at producing academic research outputs, they lag behind US academic institution when it comes to transfer these outputs to the economy. Using new survey data and controlling for standard factors affecting the productivity of Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs), we find that European TTOs do not execute less licenses than US TTOs. However, they earn significantly less revenue from licenses. We relate the difference in licensing income to differences in the organization and staffing of TTOs. Specifically, US TTOs employ more staff with experience in industry and appear to have greater flexibility in managing their budget. In the second chapter, we examine a policy regime allowing academic institutions to grant industry the intellectual property rights (IPRs) over invention resulting from collaborations. For projects that are close to the market, where a firm plays an important role in generating an invention, the researcher offers the IPRs to the firm, as an incentive to collaborate. However, he retains certain domains where he can exploit an invention without having to apply for a license. The choice of these domains involves a tradeoff. In fact, the researcher either induces the firm's effort, by assigning a broad field of use, or he ensures that he can use an invention in other applications, by granting a narrow field of use. The reverse occurs for projects that are close to the researcher's laboratory, where it is the researcher who plays an important role in generating an invention. The main difference, however, is that if effort were contractible, the firm could reward the researcher for supplying the first best level of effort, because, unlike the researcher, it is not cash constrained. An empirical analysis, based on École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne research contracts, supports the role of broad fields in bolstering a firm's effort, in projects that are close to the market. The third chapter analyzes the extent of state dependence in obtaining basic and applied science grants and the impact of receiving a grant of one type on the probability of being awarded one of the other type in the future. For this purpose, we used a sample of grants for basic and applied research purposes awarded to academic researchers at the two Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology. We find that, having controlled for unobserved heterogeneity, there is persistence in obtaining both basic and applied science grants. Moreover, the impact of having obtained, in the past, only grants of one type on the number of grants of the other type awarded to a researcher is not significantly different from the impact of not having received any grant.

EPFL2009

Innovation capacity of the agricultural sector: network of productive interactions, knowledge transfer and differentiation mechanisms

Camille Marguerite Aouinait

Economic growth is increasingly explained and driven by knowledge acquisition and firmsâ capabilities to adapt to new evolving situations to fit economic, societal and environmental frames. Strategic behavior of private companies in differentiating and promoting their products and services is crucial for their competitiveness. In parallel, public research performed at different territorial levels and by a high diversity of actors is a strategic source of key assets adding value to the firms. External actors operate in a non-linear structure allowing frequent feedback and interactive loops in order to optimise the replies to substantial problems and constantly valorise their resources. These features are explored in the thesis through different projects. This dissertation is motivated by international negotiations in the frame of the GATT agreements and bilaterally between the European Union and Switzerland that are going towards the breakdown of borders, threatening the competitiveness of the Swiss agriculture. Negative externalities will affect small firms composing this agricultural network. Thus, the dissertation is focusing on innovation as a strategic asset to maintain the competitiveness and differentiate the domestic agricultural products. The first research project concentrates on interactions occurring in the Swiss apricot network. We investigate the types of interactions producing innovations that come from different sources that are internal or external to the agricultural production supply chain. We use network theory to model the structure of the domain and understand what is inherent to innovation production thanks to collaborations through an empirical work. In the second research project, we examine whether there is a connection between the issues faced by small companies producing food and the innovative solutions and knowledge generated by research institutions. The importance of solutions to daily activities conducted by companies depends on the nature of the sector. Thus, research projects providing outputs like publications might not specifically target these issues. Moreover, access, awareness and affordability of innovations can be hindering factors for small firms composing a low-technology intensive sector. Gaps of knowledge transfer, innovation and implementation are identified in this setting. In the last research project, we address market failures hampering economic and strategic management decisions encountered in the agricultural sector. We empirically construct two case studies highlighting the necessity of intellectual appropriation mechanisms. We explore the use of patents and regional trademark to add value to the emblematic product of a small region. Organisational and marketing innovations have to be supported and diffused by key stakeholders, aiming a good communication based on criteria that take into account diverse interests of those stakeholders; consumers have to be involved in the innovation process. Furthermore, knowledge transfer, innovation generation, diffusion and implementation rely upon the will of stakeholders to take part in an efficient process of interactions and communication in order to produce and perform useful products and services. Practical implications are levered in the projects presented. Finally, digital technologies are efficient for information exchange and can decrease time and transaction costs. These technologies are explored as part of the solution to small firmsâ

EPFL2019

Patents and development in the knowledge economy

Dominique Foray

This document refers to the relevance of IP in the knowledge economy, explaining the importance of the rapid dissemination of new and superior knowledge. However, we point out that rapid dissemination can be the enemy of innovation. In this context, we explain that the patent system has many virtues as an incentive to future inventors. However, by recognising exclusive rights, the patent restricts de facto the use of knowledge and its exploitation. Patents and other intellectual property rights (IPRs) are by no means the only solution to the problem of supporting inventors in their effort to capture benefits stemming from their work. There are many other solutions to help markets produce knowledge. In spite of some misuses of the patent system leading to high transaction costs and risks of innovation blockages, it is still a vital institution for innovation policy. The system is vital, not so much for its value of providing motivation to inventors, but for creating a secure economic environment for the very high investments taht convert ideas into reality. However, we conclude that the high value of the system as "a tool for economic growth" does not apply equally to all countries.