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On Tamper-Resistance from a Theoretical Viewpoint: The Power of Seals

Related publications (52)

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Privacy failure in the public-key distance-bounding protocols

Serge Vaudenay

Public-key distance bounding protocols are well suited to defeat relay attacks in proximity access control systems when the author assume no prior shared key. At AsiaCCS 2014, Gambs, Onete, and Robert designed such a protocol with privacy protection for th ...

Inst Engineering Technology-Iet2016

On Privacy for RFID

Serge Vaudenay

Many wearable devices identify themselves in a pervasive way. But at the same time, people want to remain anonymous. Modeling anonymity and unlinkability in identification protocols is a delicate issue. In this paper, we revisit the privacy model from Asia ...

2015

On Multi-Dimensional Privacy in Context-Aware Mobile Networks

Igor Bilogrevic

By the end of 2013, the number of internet-connected mobile devices is expected to exceed that of humans. Omnipresent and context-aware, mobile devices enable people to communicate and exchange data anytime and almost anywhere. The myriad of ”digital footp ...

EPFL2014

Secure and Private Proofs for Location-Based Activity Summaries in Urban Areas

Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Kévin Clément Huguenin, Igor Bilogrevic, Thi Van Anh Pham

Activity-based social networks, where people upload and share information about their location-based activities (e.g., the routes of their activities), are increasingly popular. Such systems, however, raise privacy and security issues: the service provider ...

2014

Location leakage in distance bounding: Why location privacy does not work

Serge Vaudenay, Aikaterini Mitrokotsa

In many cases, we can only have access to a service by proving we are sufficiently close to a particular location (e.g. in automobile or building access control). In these cases, proximity can be guaranteed through signal attenuation. However, by using add ...

Elsevier2014

Security Analysis of Accountable Anonymity in Dissent

Bryan Alexander Ford, Henry Nathaniel Corrigan-Gibbs

Users often wish to communicate anonymously on the Internet, for example in group discussion or instant messaging forums. Existing solutions are vulnerable to misbehaving users, however, who may abuse their anonymity to disrupt communication. Dining Crypto ...

2014

Quantifying and Protecting Location Privacy

Reza Shokri

Recent developments in information and communication technologies have been profound and life-changing. Most people are now equipped with smart phones with high computation power and communication capabilities. These devices can efficiently run multiple so ...

EPFL2013

Strong Privacy for RFID Systems from Plaintext-Aware Encryption

Serge Vaudenay

Modeling privacy for RFID protocols went through different milestones. One pretty complete model was proposed by Vaudenay at ASIACRYPT 2007. It provides a hierarchy of privacy levels, depending on whether corruption is addressed by the protocol and on whet ...

2013

A template privacy protection scheme for fingerprint minutiae descriptors

Leila Mirmohamadsadeghi, Andrzej Drygajlo

It is important in biometric person recognition systems to protect personal data and privacy of users. This paper introduces a new mechanism to revoke and protect fingerprint minutiae information, which can be used in today’s security-aware society. The re ...

2013

UC and EUC Weak Bit-Commitments Using Seal-Once Tamper-Evidence

Serge Vaudenay

Based on tamper-evident devices, i.e., a type of distinguishable, sealed envelopes, we put forward weak bit-commitment protocols which are UC-secure. These commitments are weak in that it is legitimate that a party could cheat. Unlike in several similar li ...

2013