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This thesis is primarily concerned with two security mechanisms for wireless networks: location verification and key management. These mechanisms are potential building blocks in the security architectures of a range of applications. Under location verific ...
Securing ad hoc networks is notoriously challenging, notably due to the lack of an on-line infrastructure. In particular, key management is a problem that has been addressed by many researchers but with limited results. In this paper, we consider the case ...
We present a simple, and yet powerful, technique for key establishment over a radio link in peer-to-peer networks. Our approach is based on the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. This protocol is known to be vulnerable to the ``man-in-the-middle" attac ...
In contrast with conventional networks, mobile ad hoc networks usually do not provide on-line access to trusted authorities or to centralized servers and they exhibit frequent partitioning due to link and node failures and to node mobility. For these reaso ...
Digital signature schemes often use domain parameters such as prime numbers or elliptic curves. They can be subject to security threats when they are not treated like public keys. In this paper we formalize the notion of "signature scheme with domain param ...
In contrast with conventional networks, mobile ad hoc networks do not provide on-line access to trusted authorities or to centralized servers. For this reason, key management is particularly difficult to implement in such networks. The solutions published ...
In this note we exhibit some weakness in two key certification schemes. We show how a legitimate user can impersonate any other user in an ElGamal-based certification scheme, even if hashing is applied first. Furthermore, we show how anybody can impersonat ...
