Game Theory Meets Network Security and Privacy

This survey provides a structured and comprehensive overview of the research contributions that analyze and solve security and privacy problems in computer networks by game-theoretic approaches. A selected set of works are presented to highlight the application of game theory in order to address different forms of security and privacy problems in computer networks and mobile applications. The presented works are classified into six main categories based on their topics: security of the physical and MAC layers, application layer security in mobile networks, intrusion detection systems, anonymity and privacy, economics of network security, and cryptography. In each category, security problems, players, and game models are identified and the main results of selected works, such as equilibrium analysis and security mechanism designs are summarized. In addition, a discussion on advantages, drawbacks, and the future direction of using game theory in this field is provided. In this survey, we aim to provide a better understanding of the different research approaches for applying game theory to network security. This survey can also help researchers from various fields develop game-theoretic solutions to current and emerging security problems in computer networking.

Jean-Pierre Hubaux

This survey provides a structured and comprehensive overview of research on security and privacy in computer and communication networks that use game-theoretic approaches. We present a selected set of works to highlight the application of game theory in addressing different forms of security and privacy problems in computer networks and mobile applications. We organize the presented works in six main categories: security of the physical and MAC layers, security of self-organizing networks, intrusion detection systems, anonymity and privacy, economics of network security, and cryptography. In each category, we identify security problems, players, and game models. We summarize the main results of selected works, such as equilibrium analysis and security mechanism designs. In addition, we provide a discussion on the advantages, drawbacks, and future direction of using game theory in this field. In this survey, our goal is to instill in the reader an enhanced understanding of different research approaches in applying game-theoretic methods to network security. This survey can also help researchers from various fields develop game-theoretic solutions to current and emerging security problems in computer networking.

Assoc Computing Machinery2013

Data-centric trust in ephemeral networks

Maxime Raya

New network types require new security concepts. Surprisingly, trust – the ultimate goal of security – has not evolved as much as other concepts. In particular, the traditional notion of building trust in entities seems inadequate in an ephemeral environment where contacts among nodes are often short-lived and non-recurrent. It is actually the trustworthiness of the data that entities generate that matters most in these ephemeral networks. And what makes things more interesting is the continuous "humanization" of devices, by making them reflect more closely their owners' preferences, including the human sense of costs. Hence, in this thesis we study the notion of data-centric trust in an ephemeral network of rational nodes. The definition of a new notion requires specifying the corresponding basis, measures, and raison d'être. In the following chapters, we address these issues. We begin by defining the system and security models of an example ephemeral network, namely a vehicular network. Next, we delve into the subject of revocation in vehicular networks, before creating and analyzing a game-theoretic model of revocation, where the notion of cost-aware devices makes its first appearance in this thesis. This model not only makes possible the comparison of different revocation mechanisms in the literature, but also leads to the design of an optimal solution, the RevoGame protocol. With the security architecture in place, we formally define data-centric trust and compare several mechanisms for evaluating it. Notably, we apply the Dempster-Shafer Theory to cases of high uncertainty. Last but not least, we show that data-centric trust can reduce the privacy loss resulting from the need to establish trust. We first create a model of the trust-privacy tradeoff and then analyze it with game theory, in an environment of privacy-preserving entities. Our analysis shows that proper incentives can achieve this elusive tradeoff.

EPFL2009

Data-centric trust in ephemeral networks

Maxime Raya

EPFL2009