A Robust Noncooperative Meta-Game for Climate Negotiation in Europe
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This paper proposes a computational game-theoretic model for the international negotiations that should take place at the end of the period covered by the Kyoto protocol. These negotiations could lead to a self-enforcing agreement on a burden sharing schem ...
In this paper we propose a dynamic game theoretic modeling framework for the international climate change negotiations that should take place, at the end of the Kyoto protocol agreement, if the necessity to curb drastically carbon emissions is confirmed. T ...
This paper proposes a computable dynamic game model of the strategic competition between Russia and developing countries (DCs), mainly represented by China, on the international market of emission permits created by the Kyoto Protocol. The model uses a for ...
This paper studies the effect of different treaty designs on the success of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We analyze the standard assumption of an efficient abatement scheme and three uniform abatement quota schemes. Apart from analytical ...
This paper deals with the modeling of the strategic allocation of greenhouse gases emission allowances in the EU-wide trading market that results from Kyoto agreement implementation. An M-matrix game is formulated where the players are countries or groups ...
Switzerland, as many developed countries, face a double problem for the next round of international negotiations on climate change. On the one hand, short term economic strategies would favor the implementation of a global carbon market that would minimize ...
We analyze the implication of different allocation schemes of CO2-emission permits for stability and the success of international climate agreements. Our model combines a game theoretical with an empirical module that comprises 12 world regions and capture ...
The key role of technological change in the decline of energy and carbon intensities of aggregate economic activities is widely recognized. This has focused attention on the issue of developing endogenous models for the evolution of technological change. W ...
In this two-part paper we evaluate the effect of “endogenizing” technological learning and strategic behavior of agents in economic models used to assess climate change policies. In the first part we show the potential impact of R&D policies or demonstrati ...
This paper proposes a dynamic-game theoretic model for the international negotiations that should take place to agree on a global mitigation scheme when the real extent of climate change due to anthropogenic emissions is known. The model assumes a non-coop ...
Laboratoire de recherche en économie et management de l'environnement2005