Mixed Nash Equilibria in the Adversarial Examples Game
Related publications (37)
Graph Chatbot
Chat with Graph Search
Ask any question about EPFL courses, lectures, exercises, research, news, etc. or try the example questions below.
DISCLAIMER: The Graph Chatbot is not programmed to provide explicit or categorical answers to your questions. Rather, it transforms your questions into API requests that are distributed across the various IT services officially administered by EPFL. Its purpose is solely to collect and recommend relevant references to content that you can explore to help you answer your questions.
We consider two prominent mechanisms for the electricity market; the pay-as-bid mechanism, currently applied in certain control reserve markets, and the proposed Vickrey- Clarke-Groves mechanism, an established auction mechanism used in advertising and spe ...
The celebrated Kelly betting strategy guarantees, with probability one, higher long-run wealth than any other causal investment strategy. However, on the way to its long-term supremacy, this strategy has a notable downfall: it typically displays high varia ...
We analyze symmetric protocols to rationally coordinate on an asymmetric, efficient allocation in an infinitely repeated N-agent, C-resource allocation problems, where the resources are all homogeneous. Bhaskar proposed one way to achieve this in 2-agent, ...
This paper applies a novel two-layer optimizing control scheme to a kite-control benchmark problem. The upper layer is a recent real-time optimization algorithm, called Directional Modifier Adaptation, which represents a variation of the popular Modifier A ...
The contribution of this article is to propose and experimentally validate an optimizing control strategy for power kites flying crosswind. The control strategy provides both path control (stability) and path optimization (efficiency). The path following p ...
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers2018
We examine a generic three-stage game for two players with alternating moves, where the first player can choose the level of adjustment cost to be paid in the last period to modify the action she announced in the first period. In the resulting continuum of ...
We examine a generic three-stage game for two players with alternating moves, where the first player can choose the level of adjustment cost to be paid in the last period for modifying the action she announced in the first period. In the resulting continuu ...
We analyze resource allocation problems where N independent agents want to access C resources. Each resource can be only accessed by one agent at a time. In order to use the resources efficiently, the agents need to coordinate their access. We focus on dec ...
To achieve an optimal outcome in many situations, agents need to choose distinct actions from one another. This is the case notably in many resource allocation problems, where a single resource can only be used by one agent at a time. How shall a designer ...
To quantify a player’s commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a “canonical supergame,” which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment meas ...