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Rational Exchange -- A Formal Model Based on Game Theory

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Malicious Users in Unstructured Networks

Georgios Theodorakopoulos

Unstructured networks (like ad-hoc or peer-to-peer networks) are networks without centralized control of their operation. Users make local decisions regarding whether to follow the network protocol or not. While providing scalability benefits, this degrade ...

2007

Non-cooperative behavior in wireless networks

Mark Felegyhazi

Existing cellular networks are centrally managed and require a tremendous initial investment. With the advancement of new wireless technologies, the operators of traditional networks have to face new competition. New technologies make it possible to provid ...

EPFL2007

Nash Equilibria of Packet Forwarding Strategies in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks

Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Mark Felegyhazi, Levente Buttyan

In self-organizing ad hoc networks, all the networking functions rely on the contribution of the participants. As a basic example, nodes have to forward packets for each other in order to enable multi-hop communication. In recent years, incentive mechanism ...

2006

Coalition Formation in MANETs

Georgios Theodorakopoulos, Tao Jiang

Wireless ad-hoc networks rely on the cooperation of participating nodes for almost all their functions. However, due to resource constraints, nodes are generally selfish and try to maximize their own benefit when participating in the network. Therefore, it ...

2006

Enhancing Benign User Cooperation in the Presence of Malicious Adversaries in Ad Hoc Networks

Georgios Theodorakopoulos

Decentralized and unstructured networks are becoming more prevalent today (e.g. ad hoc networks). Like every network, they depend on the cooperation of their users to survive. However, each user does not necessarily know who the others are, or what their i ...

2006

On Selfish Behavior in CSMA/CA Networks

Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Imad Aad, Mario Cagalj

CSMA/CA protocols rely on the random deferment of packet transmissions. Like most other protocols, CSMA/CA was designed with the assumption that the nodes would play by the rules. This can be dangerous, since the nodes themselves control their random defer ...

2005

A Coupled Constraint Game Model of International Climate Policy

Marc Vielle, Alain Haurie

This paper proposes a dynamic-game theoretic model for the international negotiations that should take place to agree on a global mitigation scheme when the real extent of climate change due to anthropogenic emissions is known. The model assumes a non-coop ...

Laboratoire de recherche en économie et management de l'environnement2005

A Budget-balanced, Incentive-compatible Scheme for Social Choice

Boi Faltings

Many practical scenarios involve solving a social choice problem: a group of self-interested agents have to agree on an outcome that best fits their combined preferences. We assume that each outcome presents a certain utility to an agent and that the best ...

Springer2005

A Formal Model of Rational Exchange and Its Application to the Analysis of Syverson's Protocol

Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Levente Buttyan, Srdan Capkun

We propose a formal model of rational exchange and exchange protocols in general, which is based on game theory. In this model, an exchange protocol is represented as a set of strategies in a game that is played by the protocol parties and the network that ...

2004

On Cheating in CSMA/CA Ad Hoc Networks

Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Imad Aad, Mario Cagalj

CSMA/CA protocols rely on the random deferment of packet transmissions. Like most other protocols, CSMA/CA was designed with the assumption that the nodes would play by the rules. This is important, since the nodes themselves control their random deferment ...

2004