Publication

Eliminating Undesired Equilibrium Points from Incentive Compatible Reputation Mechanisms

Related publications (23)

Tackling Peer-to-Peer Discrimination in the Sharing Economy

Boi Faltings, Naman Goel, Maxime Rutagarama

Sharing economy platforms such as Airbnb and Uber face a major challenge in the form of peer-to-peer discrimination based on sensitive personal attributes such as race and gender. As shown by a recent study under controlled settings, reputation systems can ...

ACM2020

Can Who-Edits-What Predict Edit Survival?

Matthias Grossglauser, Lucas Maystre, Victor Kristof

As the number of contributors to online peer-production systems grows, it becomes increasingly important to predict whether the edits that users make will eventually be beneficial to the project. Existing solutions either rely on a user reputation system o ...

ACM2018

Equilibrium Models for Derivatives Markets with Frictions

Yuan Zhang

This thesis develops equilibrium models, and studies the effects of market frictions on risk-sharing, derivatives pricing, and trading patterns. In the chapter titled "Imbalance-Based Option Pricing", I develop an equilibrium model of fragmented options m ...

EPFL2018

Elicitation and Aggregation of Crowd Information

Goran Radanovic

This thesis addresses challenges in elicitation and aggregation of crowd information for settings where an information collector, called center, has a limited knowledge about information providers, called agents. Each agent is assumed to have noisy private ...

EPFL2016

Reputation design for adaptive networks with selfish agents

Ali H. Sayed

We consider a general information-sharing game over adaptive networks with selfish agents, in which a diffusion strategy is employed to estimate a common target parameter. The benefit and cost of sharing information are embedded into the individual utility ...

IEEE2013

CEO contract design: How do strong principals do it?

Rüdiger Fahlenbrach

We study changes in chief executive officer (CEO) contracts when firms transition from public ownership with dispersed owners to private ownership with strong principals in the form of private equity sponsors. The most significant changes are that a signif ...

Elsevier2013

CEO Contract Design: How Do Strong Principals Do It?

Rüdiger Fahlenbrach

Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series2012

Effective Usage of Computational Trust Models in Rational Environments

Karl Aberer, Hung Le Vu

Computational reputation-based trust models using statistical learning have been intensively studied for distributed systems where peers behave maliciously. However practical applications of such models in environments with both malicious and rational beha ...

2011

Revocation Games in Ephemeral Networks

Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Mark Felegyhazi, Maxime Raya

A frequently proposed solution to node misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks is to use reputation systems. But in ephemeral networks - a new breed of mobile networks where contact times between nodes are short and neighbors change frequently - reputations ...

2008

Reputation Systems for Self-Organized Networks

Jean-Yves Le Boudec, Jochen Mundinger, Sonja Buchegger

Self-organized networks such as mobile ad-hoc, Internet-based peer-to-peer, wireless mesh and Fourth Generation (4G) Wireless networks depend on cooperation of nodes. Reputation systems help nodes decide with whom to cooperate and which nodes to avoid. The ...

2008

Graph Chatbot

Chat with Graph Search

Ask any question about EPFL courses, lectures, exercises, research, news, etc. or try the example questions below.

DISCLAIMER: The Graph Chatbot is not programmed to provide explicit or categorical answers to your questions. Rather, it transforms your questions into API requests that are distributed across the various IT services officially administered by EPFL. Its purpose is solely to collect and recommend relevant references to content that you can explore to help you answer your questions.