A RISC-V Extension to Minimize Privileges of Enclave Runtimes

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Trust as a Programming Primitive

Programming has changed; programming languages have not. Modern software embraced reusable software components, i.e., public libraries, and runs in the cloud, on machines that co-locate applications from various origins. This new programming paradigm leads ...

EPFL2021

Distributed Momentum for Byzantine-resilient Stochastic Gradient Descent

Rachid Guerraoui, El Mahdi El Mhamdi, Sébastien Louis Alexandre Rouault

Byzantine-resilient Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) aims at shielding model training from Byzantine faults, be they ill-labeled training datapoints, exploited software/hardware vulnerabilities, or malicious worker nodes in a distributed setting. Two rece ...

2021

mu RAI: Securing Embedded Systems with Return Address Integrity

Mathias Josef Payer

Embedded systems are deployed in security critical environments and have become a prominent target for remote attacks. Microcontroller-based systems (MCUS) are particularly vulnerable due to a combination of limited resources and low level programming whic ...

INTERNET SOC2020

Security-aware Routing and Scheduling for Control Applications on Ethernet TSN Networks

Amir Aminifar

Today, it is common knowledge in the cyber-physical systems domain that the tight interaction between the cyber and physical elements provides the possibility of substantially improving the performance of these systems that is otherwise impossible. On the ...

ASSOC COMPUTING MACHINERY2020

Malware in the SGX supply chain: Be careful when signing enclaves!

Rafael Pereira Pires, Pascal Felber

Malware attacks are a significant part of the new software security threats detected each year. Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) are a set of hardware instructions introduced by Intel in their recent lines of processors that are intended to provide a ...

2022

X-Attack: Remote Activation of Satisfiability Don’t-Care Hardware Trojans on Shared FPGAs

Mirjana Stojilovic, Dina Gamaleldin Ahmed Shawky Mahmoud, Wei Hu

Albeit very appealing, FPGA multitenancy in the cloud computing environment is currently on hold due to a number of recently discovered vulnerabilities to side-channel attacks and covert communication. In this work, we successfully demonstrate a new attack ...

IEEE2020

PoLPer: Process-Aware Restriction of Over-Privileged Setuid Calls in Legacy Applications

Mathias Josef Payer, Zhenyu Wu

setuid system calls enable critical functions such as user authentications and modular privileged components. Such operations must only be executed after careful validation. However, current systems do not perform rigorous checks, allowing exploitation of ...

ASSOC COMPUTING MACHINERY2019

Secured Routines: Language-based Construction of Trusted Execution Environments

James Richard Larus, Edouard Bugnion, Adrien Ghosn

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), such as Intel SGX enclaves, use hardware to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of operations on sensitive data. While the technology is available on many processors, the complexity of its programming model and i ...

USENIX ASSOC2019

Privacy-Enhancing Technologies for Mobile Applications and Services

Thi Van Anh Pham

Over a third of the world 's population owns a smartphone. As generic computing devices that support a large and heterogeneous collection of mobile applications (apps), smartphones provide a plethora of functionalities and services to billions of users. B ...

EPFL2019

SMoTherSpectre: Exploiting Speculative Execution through Port Contention

Babak Falsafi, Mathias Josef Payer, Atri Bhattacharyya

Spectre, Meltdown, and related attacks have demonstrated that kernels, hypervisors, trusted execution environments, and browsers are prone to information disclosure through micro-architectural weaknesses. However, it remains unclear as to what extent other ...

ACM2019

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