Guerre de 4e génération

Fourth-generation warfare (4GW) is conflict characterized by a blurring of the distinction between war and politics, and of the distinction between combatants and civilians. The term was first used in 1980 by a team of United States analysts, including William S. Lind, to describe warfare's return to a decentralized form. In terms of generational modern warfare, the fourth generation signifies the nation states' loss of their near-monopoly on combat forces, returning to modes of conflict common in pre-modern times. The simplest definition includes any war in which one of the major participants is not a state but rather a violent non-state actor. Classical examples of this type of conflict, such as the slave uprising under Spartacus, predate the modern concept of warfare. Fourth-generation warfare is defined as conflicts which involve the following elements: Complex and long term Terrorism (tactic) A non-national or transnational base – highly decentralized A direct attack on the enemy's culture, including genocidal acts against civilians. All available pressures are used – political, economic, social and military Occurs in low-intensity conflict, involving actors from all networks Non-combatants are tactical dilemmas Lack of hierarchy Small in size, spread out network of communication and financial support Use of insurgency tactics as subversion, terrorism and guerrilla tactics Decentralised forces The concept was first described by the authors William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (US Army), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (US Army), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR) in a 1989 Marine Corps Gazette article titled "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation". In 2006, the concept was expanded upon by USMC Colonel Thomas X. Hammes (Ret.) in his book, The Sling and The Stone. The generations of warfare described by these authors are: First generation: tactics of line and column; which developed in the age of the smoothbore musket.

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Concepts associés (9)

Armée irrégulière

vignette|Soldats irréguliers à Beauharnois, Québec, Bas-Canada, au 19 siècle. L'armée irrégulière est toute composante militaire non standard qui est distincte des forces armées nationales d'un pays. Étant défini par l'exclusion, il existe une variation significative dans ce qui relève du terme. Il peut faire référence au type d'organisation militaire ou au type de tactique utilisée. Une organisation militaire irrégulière est une organisation qui ne fait pas partie de l'organisation de l'armée régulière.

Contre-insurrection

vignette|Des policiers interrogent un civil malaisien durant l'insurrection communiste malaise (1949) la contre-insurrection implique une coopération entre les forces de police et les forces armée La contre-insurrection, aussi appelée guerre contre-subversive, guerre contre-révolutionnaire, guerre contre-insurrectionnelle, contre-guérilla, guerre révolutionnaire ou encore COIN (de l'anglais counterinsurgency), est une doctrine militaire qui vise à obtenir le soutien de la population dans le cadre d'un confli

Low-intensity conflict

A low-intensity conflict (LIC) is a military conflict, usually localised, between two or more state or non-state groups which is below the intensity of conventional war. It involves the state's use of military forces applied selectively and with restraint to enforce compliance with its policies or objectives. The term can be used to describe conflicts where at least one or both of the opposing parties operate along such lines.