We develop a methodology to measure the expected loss of commercial banks in a market downturn, which we call stressed expected loss (SEL). We simulate a market downturn as a negative shock on interest rate and credit market risk factors that reflect the b ...
We challenge the view that short-term debt curbs moral hazard and demonstrate that, in a world with financing frictions and fair debt pricing, short-term debt generates incentives for risk-taking. To do so, we develop a model in which firms are financed wi ...
This thesis develops three models that study the motivation of various agents to take on debt,
and the impact that excessive financial leverage can have on social welfare.
In the chapter "Short-term Bank Leverage and the Value of Liquid Reserves", the ince ...
We show that partial versus full multilateral netting of interbank liabilities increases bank shortfall and reduces clearing asset price and aggregate bank surplus. We also show that partial multilateral netting can be worse than no netting at all. ...
We study optimal securitization in the presence of an initial moral hazard. A financial intermediary creates and then sells to outside investors defaultable assets, whose default risk is determined by the unobservable costly effort exerted by the intermedi ...
This thesis consists of three chapters. The first chapter endogenizes technological change by introducing a stylized innovation process driven by a R&D–dependent Poisson process in a Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) production economy. The model reproduces s ...
