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Concept
Argument from free will
Résumé
The argument from free will, also called the paradox of free will or theological fatalism, contends that omniscience and free will are incompatible and that any conception of God that incorporates both properties is therefore inconceivable. See the various controversies over claims of God's omniscience, in particular the critical notion of foreknowledge. These arguments are deeply concerned with the implications of predestination.
Some arguments against the existence of God focus on the supposed incoherence of humankind possessing free will and God's omniscience. These arguments are deeply concerned with the implications of predestination.
Noted Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides described the conflict between divine omnipotence and his creation's person's free will, in traditional terms of good and evil actions, as follows:
... "Does God know or does He not know that a certain individual will be good or bad? If thou sayest 'He knows', then it necessarily follows that the man is compelled to act as God knew beforehand how he would act, otherwise, God's knowledge would be imperfect...."
A "standard Anglican" theologian gave a similar description of Christian revelation:
... Scripture hold before us two great counter-truths – first, God's absolute sovereignty (cp Rome. 9, 20ff.), and secondly, man's responsibility. Our intellects cannot reconcile them.
A logical formulation of this argument might go as follows:
God knows choice "C" that a human would claim to "make freely".
It is now necessary that C.
If it is now necessary that C, then C cannot be otherwise (this is the definition of “necessary”). That is, there are no actual "possibilities" due to predestination.
If you cannot do otherwise when you act, you do not act freely (Principle of Alternate Possibilities)
Therefore, when you do an act, you will not do it freely.
Norman Swartz, however, contends that the above arguments commit the modal fallacy. In particular, he asserts that these arguments assume that if C is true, it becomes necessary for C to be true, which is incorrect as C is contingent (see modal logic).
Source officielle
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