In law, the principle of imputation or attribution underpins the concept that ignorantia juris non excusat—ignorance of the law does not excuse. All laws are published and available for study in all developed states. The content of the law is imputed to all persons who are within the jurisdiction, no matter how transiently.
This fiction tries to negate the unfairness of someone avoiding liability for an act or omission by simply denying knowledge of the law. The principle also arises in specific areas of law, such as criminal law and commercial law, to describe the need for the law to hold a person liable, even when they may not have known the particular circumstances that caused another person to sustain loss or damage.
To incur liability for a crime, a person must have both committed a prohibited act (the actus reus, which must be willed: see automatism) and have had an appropriate mental element (the mens rea) at the relevant time (see the technical requirement for concurrence). A key component of the mens rea is any knowledge that the alleged criminal might have had. For these purposes, knowledge can be both actual and constructive—i.e., the court can impute knowledge where appropriate.
There is no problem when the alleged criminal actually intended to cause the particular harm. Things are more difficult when the defendant denies actual knowledge. When evaluating behavior, the legal process assumes the defendant was aware of their immediate physical surroundings and understood practical cause and effect. A mens rea is imputed when a person with reasonable foresight in the same circumstances would have foreseen that the actus reus would occur. This prevents a person from raising a defence based on willful blindness (note that in the United States, wilful blindness has a slightly different meaning).
A problem arises when the defendant is a corporation. By its nature, a fictitious person can only act through the human agency of the natural persons that it employs. Equally, it has no mind to constitute the mens rea.
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En droit pénal canadien, l'insouciance est un degré de subjective qui implique d'agir consciemment malgré l'existence du risque injustifié que l'infraction soit commise. Dans la mens rea subjective, l'insouciance se distingue de l'intention en raison de l'ampleur du risque qui est pris. De plus, le degré de culpabilité morale de la personne insouciante n'atteint pas le niveau où la personne aurait le désir des conséquences (ce qui serait bien sûr plus coupable).
In criminal law, intent is a subjective state of mind (mens rea) that must accompany the acts of certain crimes to constitute a violation. A more formal, generally synonymous legal term is scienter: intent or knowledge of wrongdoing. Intent is defined in English law by the ruling in R v Mohan [1976] QB 1 as "the decision to bring about a prohibited consequence" (malum prohibitum). A range of words represents shades of intent in criminal laws around the world.
L'omission est un concept en droit qui peut être défini comme un manquement volontaire ou involontaire de faire ou de dire qqch alors qu'un devoir d'agir implicite ou explicite existe. En France, chaque avocat peut se faire « omettre » du barreau, c'est-à-dire qu'il reste membre de l'Ordre mais ne peut plus faire état de son titre d'avocat ni exercer cette profession ; cette procédure est employée notamment pour pouvoir exercer des activités incompatibles avec celle d'avocat ou bien pour des raisons de santé.