In economics and consumer theory, a linear utility function is a function of the form:
or, in vector form:
where:
is the number of different goods in the economy.
is a vector of size that represents a bundle. The element represents the amount of good in the bundle.
is a vector of size that represents the subjective preferences of the consumer. The element represents the relative value that the consumer assigns to good . If , this means that the consumer thinks that product is totally worthless. The higher is, the more valuable a unit of this product is for the consumer.
A consumer with a linear utility function has the following properties:
The preferences are strictly monotone: having a larger quantity of even a single good strictly increases the utility.
The preferences are weakly convex, but not strictly convex: a mix of two equivalent bundles is equivalent to the original bundles, but not better than it.
The marginal rate of substitution of all goods is constant. For every two goods :
The indifference curves are straight lines (when there are two goods) or hyperplanes (when there are more goods).
Each demand curve (demand as a function of price) is a step function: the consumer wants to buy zero units of a good whose utility/price ratio is below the maximum, and wants to buy as many units as possible of a good whose utility/price ratio is maximum.
The consumer regards the goods as perfect substitute goods.
Define a linear economy as an exchange economy in which all agents have linear utility functions. A linear economy has several properties.
Assume that each agent has an initial endowment . This is a vector of size in which the element represents the amount of good that is initially owned by agent . Then, the initial utility of this agent is .
Suppose that the market prices are represented by a vector - a vector of size in which the element is the price of good . Then, the budget of agent is . While this price vector is in effect, the agent can afford all and only the bundles that satisfy the budget constraint: .
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Competitive equilibrium (also called: Walrasian equilibrium) is a concept of economic equilibrium, introduced by Kenneth Arrow and Gérard Debreu in 1951, appropriate for the analysis of commodity markets with flexible prices and many traders, and serving as the benchmark of efficiency in economic analysis. It relies crucially on the assumption of a competitive environment where each trader decides upon a quantity that is so small compared to the total quantity traded in the market that their individual transactions have no influence on the prices.
En économie, une courbe d'indifférence est l'ensemble des combinaisons de deux biens qui procurent au consommateur un niveau de satisfaction identique. En microéconomie, une courbe d'indifférence est une courbe permettant de représenter l'ensemble des combinaisons de deux biens pour lesquels un agent économique (tel qu'un consommateur ou une entreprise) serait indifférent, c'est-à-dire qu'il n'aurait pas de préférence pour une combinaison plutôt qu'une autre en termes d'utilité ordinale.
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