Intermédiaire financier | EPFL Graph Search

Les s'interposent entre les agents économiques en ajustant l'offre de capitaux à la demande de capitaux, c'est-à-dire en drainant les capacités de financement de certains agents (constituées par une épargne inutilisée) pour les prêter ou replacer ensuite à d'autres agents. Ce terme connaît une extension aux domaines des crédits, aux particuliers et aux professionnels, ainsi qu'à celui des assurances, avec les Intermédiaires en Opérations de Banque et Services de Paiement (IOBSP) iobsp. Toutefois, lorsque l'on parle d'intermédiation, il est question plus spécifiquement de l'activité traditionnelle des banques, qui reçoivent des dépôts pour leur compte et prêtent de l'argent pour leur compte. Cela les distingue par exemple de l'activité de Courtier en bourse dans laquelle l'intermédiaire n'est qu'un transmetteur d'ordre entre un acheteur et un vendeur sur un marché organisé. C'est ainsi qu'on parle de désintermédiation pour les opérations de financement où les banques ne jouent pas un rôle de contrepartie direct auprès des particuliers et entreprises offreurs ou demandeurs de capitaux. La nécessité de l'apparition des intermédiaires financiers est née des imperfections et des incomplétudes de marché. Toutefois afin que l'argent des ménages "ne dorme pas sous leur matelas" et leur rapporte, les épargnants ont choisi de confier leurs économies à ces intermédiaires, types banques (IF monétaires), mais il n'y a pas que les banques mais aussi les OPCVM, fonds de pension, fonds spéculatifs,ou encore les compagnies d'assurances (IF non monétaires). On doit l'existence des IF a 4 éléments, ils permettent: Les économies d'échelles La diversification du risque La réduction des Coûts de transaction La réduction des asymétries d'information Les IF permettent donc de réduire les risques et les coûts d'un investissement direct. L'intermédiation bancaire connaît toutefois de notables évolutions, avec le développement et l'organisation du métier d'Intermédiaire en Opérations de Banque et Services de Paiement (IOBSP).

Essays in Financial Economics

Marc André Frattaroli

This thesis consists of three chapters that study separate subjects in the area of corporate governance and financial intermediation. In the first chapter, I study a protectionist anti-takeover law introduced in 2014 in France that covers a subset of all firms in the economy. The law decreased affected firms' likelihood of becoming the target of a merger or acquisition and had a negative impact on shareholder value. There is no evidence that management of those firms subsequently altered firm policies in its interest. Investment, employment, wages, profitability, and capital structure remain unchanged. The share of annual CEO compensation consisting of equity instruments increased by 8.4 percentage points, suggesting that boards reacted to the loss in monitoring by the takeover market by increasing the pay-for-performance sensitivity. In the second chapter, which is co-authored work with Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, we conduct a detailed analysis of investors in successful initial coin offerings (ICOs). The average ICO has 4,700 contributors. The median participant contributes small amounts and many investors sell their tokens before the underlying product is developed. Large presale investors obtain tokens at a discount and flip part of their allocation shortly after the ICO. ICO contributors lack the protections traditionally afforded to investors in early stage financing. Nevertheless, returns nine months after the ICO are positive on average, driven mostly by an increase in the value of the Ethereum cryptocurrency. In the third chapter, which is joint work with Christoph Herpfer, we investigate how bankers use information from lending relationships to help borrowers combine resources in strategic alliances. Firms that have borrowed from the same banker or share an indirect connection through a network of bankers are significantly more likely to enter an alliance. Consistent with bankers overcoming informational frictions, their ability to facilitate alliances decreases with network distance, and is stronger for opaque borrowers. Firms connected to more potential partners via banker networks enter more alliances. These alliances are associated with positive announcement returns and brokering banks are more likely to receive future underwriting mandates.

EPFL2020

Financial Frictions within the Macroeconomy

Victoria Nuguer

Financial factors are central to the recent economic crisis. Most macroeconomic models treat banks and financial intermediation as a veil. These models are unable to account for the recent financial crisis and they cannot be used for policy evaluation. Financial frictions include default on mortgages, disruptions in financial intermediation, and informational asymmetries, among others. In my dissertation, I propose to analyze the effects of policy in economic models characterized by financial frictions. The thesis is composed of three chapters. The first chapter is joint work with Luisa Lambertini and Pinar Uysal. We explicitly model the housing sector, mortgages, and endogenous default as well as nominal and real rigidities in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) setting. We use U.S. data for the period 1981-2006 to estimate our model using Bayesian techniques. Our starting point is to have an empirically plausible model with endogenous default in mortgages that can explain the main features of the macroeconomic time series. We analyze how an increase in the mortgage default rate can spread to the rest of the economy and result in a recession. Next we examine different policy options that might mitigate the effects of an increase in the mortgage default rate. In the second chapter I develop a two-country DSGE model with global banks (financial intermediaries in one country lend to banks in the other country). Banks are financially constrained on how much they can borrow from households. The main goal is to obtain a framework that captures the international transmission of a financial crisis through the balance sheet of the global banks as well as to explain the insurance mechanism of the international asset market. A negative shock to the value of the capital in one country generates a global financial crisis through the international interbank market. The third chapter uses the above model to analyze the policy challenges that global banks face. In this chapter, I look at how different unconventional unilateral credit policies help to mitigate the effects of a financial disruption. First, the policies are carried out only by the policy maker of the country directly hit by the shock. Consumers of the country where the intervention and the shock take place are better off with policy than without it; consumers from the other country are worse off. Second, I allow for both policy makers to intervene. Both countries intervening help to reduce the negative effects of the country that is not directly hit by the shock but the intervention is not a Pareto improvement.

EPFL2014