Êtes-vous un étudiant de l'EPFL à la recherche d'un projet de semestre?

Travaillez avec nous sur des projets en science des données et en visualisation, et déployez votre projet sous forme d'application sur GraphSearch.

Découvrez-en plus sur les applications Graph.

Graph
Search

fr|en

Se Connecter

Concept

Cryptanalyse linéaire

Résumé

La cryptanalyse linéaire est une technique inventée par Mitsuru Matsui, chercheur chez Mitsubishi Electric. Elle date de 1993 et fut développée à l'origine pour casser l'algorithme de chiffrement symétrique DES. Ce type de cryptanalyse se base sur un concept antérieur à la découverte de Matsui : les expressions linéaires probabilistes. Ces dernières ont été étudiées par Henri Gilbert et Anne Tardy-Corfdir dans le cadre d'une attaque sur FEAL. La cryptanalyse linéaire est plus efficace que la cryptanalyse différentielle, mais moins pratique pour la simple et bonne raison que l'on part du principe que l'attaquant ne dispose pas de la boîte noire symbolisant l'algorithme de chiffrement, et qu'il ne peut pas soumettre ses propres textes. Dans le cas de DES, cette attaque nécessitait à l'origine 2^{47} couples (tous chiffrés avec la même clé) que l'attaquant a pu récupérer par un moyen ou un autre. Par la suite, Matsui améliore son algorithme en 1994 et propose une solution a

Source officielle

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptanalyse_lin%C3%A9aire

À propos de ce résultat

Cette page est générée automatiquement et peut contenir des informations qui ne sont pas correctes, complètes, à jour ou pertinentes par rapport à votre recherche. Il en va de même pour toutes les autres pages de ce site. Veillez à vérifier les informations auprès des sources officielles de l'EPFL.

Publications associées (31)

Chargement

Afficher plus

Publications associées

Chargement

Personnes associées (2)

Personnes associées

Chargement

Unités associées (1)

Unités associées

Chargement

Concepts associés (11)

Concepts associés

Chargement

Cours associés (6)

This course reviews some failure cases in public-key cryptography. It introduces some cryptanalysis techniques. It also presents fundamentals in cryptography such as interactive proofs. Finally, it presents some techniques to validate the security of cryptographic primitives.

This course provides an overview of key advances in continuous optimization and statistical analysis for machine learning. We review recent learning formulations and models as well as their guarantees, describe scalable solution techniques and algorithms, and illustrate the trade-offs involved.

Ce cours présente une vue générale des techniques d'apprentissage automatique, passant en revue les algorithmes, le formalisme théorique et les protocoles expérimentaux.

Afficher plus

Cours associés

Chargement

Séances de cours associées (10)

Afficher plus

Séances de cours associées

Chargement

Publications associées (31)

DES S-box generator

Lauren De Meyer, Serge Vaudenay

The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is a cryptographic algorithm, designed by IBM, that was selected to be the national standard in 1977 by the National Bureau of Standards. The algorithm itself was entirely published but the design criteria were kept secret until 1994 when Coppersmith, one of the designers of DES, published them. He states that the IBM team already knew about the attack called Differential cryptanalysis during the design of the algorithm and that it had an effect on choosing the S-boxes. To be more specific, he mentions eight design criteria that all the S-boxes of DES are based on. How the S-boxes were generated is a mystery, as the legend says this was outsourced to the NSA. Indeed, building a set of S-boxes respecting these criteria is a non-trivial task. In this paper we present an efficient S-box generator respecting all criteria and even more. Coppersmith's design criteria served as a basis but were strengthened for better resistance to Linear Cryptanalysis. While other researchers have already proposed S-box generators for DES satisfying either non-linearity or good diffusion, our generator offers both. Moreover, apart from suggesting a new set of 8 S-boxes, it can also very quickly produce a large pool of S-boxes to be used in further research.

Taylor & Francis Inc2016

Chargement

Cryptanalysis of the full MMB Block Cipher

Jorge Nakahara, Yue Sun

The block cipher MMB was designed by Daemen, Govaerts and Vandewalle, in 1993, as an alternative to the IDEA block cipher. We exploit and describe unusual properties of the modular multiplication in ZZ232 −1 , which lead to a diﬀerential attack on the full 6-round MMB cipher (both versions 1.0 and 2.0). Further contributions of this paper include detailed square and linear cryptanalysis of MMB. Concerning diﬀerential cryptanalysis (DC), we can break the full MMB with 2118 chosen plaintexts, 295.91 6-round MMB encryptions and 264 counters, eﬀectively bypassing the cipher’s countermeasures against DC. For the square attack, we can recover the 128-bit user key for 4-round MMB with 234 chosen plaintexts, 2126.32 4-round encryptions and 264 mem- ory blocks. Concerning linear cryptanalysis, we present a key-recovery attack on 3-round MMB requiring 2114.56 known-plaintexts and 2126 en- cryptions. Moreover, we detail a ciphertext-only attack on 2-round MMB using 293.6 ciphertexts and 293.6 parity computations. These attacks do not depend on weak-key or weak-subkey assumptions, and are thus in- dependent of the key schedule algorithm.

Springer2009

Chargement

Cryptanalysis of the full MMB block cipher

Jorge Nakahara, Yue Sun

The block cipher MMB was designed by Daemen, Govaerts and Vandewalle, in 1993, as an alternative to the IDEA block cipher. We exploit and describe unusual properties of the modular multiplication in

Z_{2^{32} - 1}

, which lead to a differential attack on the full 6-round MMB cipher (both versions 1.0 and 2.0). Further contributions of this paper include detailed square and linear cryptanalysis of MMB. Concerning differential cryptanalysis (DC), we can break the full MMB with 2^118 chosen plaintexts, 2^95.91 6-round MMB encryptions and 2^64 counters, effectively bypassing the cipher's countermeasures against DC. For the square attack, we can recover the 128-bit user key for 4-round MMB with 2^34 chosen plaintexts, 2^126.32 4-round encryptions and 2^64 memory blocks. Concerning linear cryptanalysis, we present a key-recovery attack on 3-round MMB requiring 2^114.56 known-plaintexts and 2^126 encryptions. Moreover, we detail a ciphertext-only attack on 2-round MMB using 2^93.6 ciphertexts and 2^93.6 parity computations. These attacks do not depend on weak-key or weak-subkey assumptions, and are thus independent of the key schedule algorithm.

2009

Chargement

Afficher plus

Cryptanalysis of the full MMB block cipher

Jorge Nakahara, Yue Sun

The block cipher MMB was designed by Daemen, Govaerts and Vandewalle, in 1993, as an alternative to the IDEA block cipher. We exploit and describe unusual properties of the modular multiplication in

Z_{2^{32} - 1}

2009