En informatique, une adresse virtuelle est une adresse de la mémoire virtuelle qu'un système d'exploitation met à disposition de ses processus pour qu'ils puissent s'exécuter. L'expression est souvent employée par opposition à l'adresse physique dans laquelle elle est convertie par l'unité de gestion mémoire (MMU). Structure Une adresse virtuelle en architecture 32 bits comprend trois parties :

De 0 à 11 : index du mot dans la page.

De 12 à 21: index de la page dans le répertoire.

De 22 à 31 : index du répertoire dans la mémoire.

Par exemple l'adresse 0x0012F980 représente en système binaire 0000000000 0100101111 100110000000), correspondant à : répertoire page mot 0000000000 0100101111 100110000000 Notes et références Voir aussi

Adressage mémoire
Mémoire paginée

Catégorie:Mémoire informatique

Rebooting Virtual Memory with Midgard

Atri Bhattacharyya, Babak Falsafi, Siddharth Gupta, Yunho Oh, Mathias Josef Payer

Computer systems designers are building cache hierarchies with higher capacity to capture the ever-increasing working sets of modern workloads. Cache hierarchies with higher capacity improve system performance but shift the performance bottleneck to address translation. We propose Midgard, an intermediate address space between the virtual and the physical address spaces, to mitigate address translation overheads without program-level changes. Midgard leverages the operating system concept of virtual memory areas (VMAs) to realize a single Midgard address space where VMAs of all processes can be uniquely mapped. The Midgard address space serves as the namespace for all data in a coherence domain and the cache hierarchy. Because real-world workloads use far fewer VMAs than pages to represent their virtual address space, virtual to Midgard translation is achieved with hardware structures that are much smaller than TLB hierarchies. Costlier Midgard to physical address translations are needed only on LLC misses, which become much less frequent with larger caches. As a consequence, Midgard shows that instead of amplifying address translation overheads, memory hierarchies with large caches can reduce address translation overheads. Our evaluation shows that Midgard achieves only 5% higher address translation overhead as compared to traditional TLB hierarchies for 4KB pages when using a 16MB aggregate LLC. Midgard also breaks even with traditional TLB hierarchies for 2MB pages when using a 256MB aggregate LLC. For cache hierarchies with higher capacity, Midgard's address translation overhead drops to near zero as secondary and tertiary data working sets fit in the LLC, while traditional TLBs suffer even higher degrees of address translation overhead.

2021

Object-Oriented Recovery for Non-volatile Memory

David Teksen Aksun, Nachshon Cohen, James Richard Larus

New non-volatile memory (NVM) technologies enable direct, durable storage of data in an application's heap. Durable, randomly accessible memory facilitates the construction of applications that do not lose data at system shutdown or power failure. Existing NVM programming frameworks provide mechanisms to consistently capture a running application's state. They do not, however, fully support object-oriented languages or ensure that the persistent heap is consistent with the environment when the application is restarted. In this paper, we propose a new NVM language extension and runtime system that supports object-oriented NVM programming and avoids the pitfalls of prior approaches. At the heart of our technique is \emph{object reconstruction}, which transparently restores and reconstructs a persistent object's state during program restart. It is implemented in NVMReconstruction, a Clang/LLVM extension and runtime library that provides: (i) transient fields in persistent objects, (ii) support for virtual functions and function pointers, (iii) direct representation of persistent pointers as virtual addresses, and (iv) type-specific reconstruction of a persistent object during program restart. In addition, NVMReconstruction supports updating an application's code, even if this causes objects to expand, by providing object migration. NVMReconstruction also can compact the persistent heap to reduce fragmentation. In experiments, we demonstrate the versatility and usability of object reconstruction and its low runtime performance cost.

ACM2018

SoK: Shining Light on Shadow Stacks

Mathias Josef Payer, Xiangyu Zhang

Control-Flow Hijacking attacks are the dominant attack vector against C/C++ programs. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) solutions mitigate these attacks on the forward edge, i.e., indirect calls through function pointers and virtual calls. Protecting the backward edge is left to stack canaries, which are easily bypassed through information leaks. Shadow Stacks are a fully precise mechanism for protecting backwards edges, and should be deployed with CFI mitigations. We present a comprehensive analysis of all possible shadow stack mechanisms along three axes: performance, compatibility, and security. For performance comparisons we use SPEC CPU2006, while security and compatibility are qualitatively analyzed. Based on our study, we renew calls for a shadow stack design that leverages a dedicated register, resulting in low performance overhead, and minimal memory overhead, but sacrifices compatibility. We present case studies of our implementation of such a design, Shadesmar, on Phoronix and Apache to demonstrate the feasibility of dedicating a general purpose register to a security monitor on modern architectures, and Shadesmar's deployability. Our comprehensive analysis, including detailed case studies for our novel design, allows compiler designers and practitioners to select the correct shadow stack design for different usage scenarios. Shadow stacks belong to the class of defense mechanisms that require metadata about the program's state to enforce their defense policies. Protecting this metadata for deployed mitigations requires in-process isolation of a segment of the virtual address space. Prior work on defenses in this class has relied on information hiding to protect metadata. We show that stronger guarantees are possible by repurposing two new Intel x86 extensions for memory protection (MPX), and page table control (MPK). Building on our isolation efforts with MPX and MPK, we present the design requirements for a dedicated hardware mechanism to support intra-process memory isolation, and discuss how such a mechanism can empower the next wave of highly precise software security mitigations that rely on partially isolated information in a process.

IEEE COMPUTER SOC2019

SoK: Shining Light on Shadow Stacks

Mathias Josef Payer, Xiangyu Zhang

IEEE COMPUTER SOC2019

Adresse virtuelle

De 0 à 11 : index du mot dans la page.

De 12 à 21: index de la page dans le répertoire.

De 22 à 31 : index du répertoire dans la mémoire.

Rebooting Virtual Memory with Midgard

Object-Oriented Recovery for Non-volatile Memory

SoK: Shining Light on Shadow Stacks

Rebooting Virtual Memory with Midgard

SoK: Shining Light on Shadow Stacks

Object-Oriented Recovery for Non-volatile Memory