Personne
Rüdiger Fahlenbrach
Publications associées (25)
Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis
We investigate whether bank performance during the recent credit crisis is related to chief executive officer (CEO) incentives before the crisis. We find some evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of sharehol ...
2011Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument
Large shareholders may play an important role for firm performance and policies, but identifying this empirically presents a challenge due to the endogeneity of ownership structures. We develop and test an empirical framework that allows us to separate sel ...
Cambridge University Press2011Former CEO Directors: Lingering CEOs or Valuable Resources?
We investigate corporate governance experts' claim that it is detrimental to a firm to reappoint former CEOs as directors after they step down as CEOs. We find that more successful and more powerful former CEOs are more likely to be reappointed to the boar ...
Oxford University Press2011Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors?
Companies actively seek to appoint outside CEOs to their boards. Consistent with our matching theory of outside CEO board appointments, we show that such appointments have a certification benefit for the appointing firm. CEOs are more likely to join boards ...
Elsevier2010Does information drive trading in option strategies?
We study trading in option strategies in the FTSE-100 index market. Trades in option strategies represent around 37% of the total number of trades and over 75% of the total trading volume in our sample. We find some evidence that order flow in volatility-s ...
Elsevier2010The Dark Side of Outside Directors: Do They Quit When They are Most Needed?
Outside directors have incentives to resign to protect their reputation or to avoid an increase in their workload when they anticipate that the firm on whose board they sit will perform poorly or disclose adverse news. We call these incentives the dark sid ...
Fisher College of Business2010Managerial ownership dynamics and firm value
From 1988 to 2003, the average change in managerial ownership is significantly negative every year for American firms. We find that managers are more likely to significantly decrease their ownership when their firms are performing well, but not more likely ...
2009Large Shareholders and Corporate Policies
We analyze the effects of heterogeneity across large shareholders, using a new blockholder-firm panel dataset in which we can track all unique blockholders among large public firms in the United States. We find statistically significant and economically im ...
Oxford University Press2009Founder-CEOs, investment decisions, and stock market performance
Eleven percent of the largest public U.S. firms are headed by the CEO who founded the firm. Founder-CEO firms differ systematically from successor-CEO firms with respect to firm valuation, investment behavior, and stock market performance. Founder-CEO firm ...
Cambridge University Press2009Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation
I analyze the role of executive compensation in corporate governance. As proxies for corporate governance, I use board size, board independence, CEO-chair duality, institutional ownership concentration, CEO tenure, and an index of shareholder rights. The r ...
2008