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On Non-cooperative Location Privacy: A Game-theoretic Analysis

Publications associées (60)

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Non-cooperative behavior in wireless networks

Mark Felegyhazi

Existing cellular networks are centrally managed and require a tremendous initial investment. With the advancement of new wireless technologies, the operators of traditional networks have to face new competition. New technologies make it possible to provid ...

EPFL2007

Border Games in Cellular Networks

Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Mark Felegyhazi, Mario Cagalj, Diego Dufour

In each country today, cellular networks operate on carefully separated frequency bands. This separation is imposed by the regulators of the given country to avoid interference between these networks. But, the separation is only valid within the borders of ...

2007

Securing Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks

Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Maxime Raya

Vehicular networks are very likely to be deployed in the coming years and thus become the most relevant form of mobile ad hoc networks. In this paper, we address the security of these networks. We provide a detailed threat analysis and devise an appropriat ...

2007

Nash Equilibria of Packet Forwarding Strategies in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks

Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Mark Felegyhazi, Levente Buttyan

In self-organizing ad hoc networks, all the networking functions rely on the contribution of the participants. As a basic example, nodes have to forward packets for each other in order to enable multi-hop communication. In recent years, incentive mechanism ...

2006

Enhancing Benign User Cooperation in the Presence of Malicious Adversaries in Ad Hoc Networks

Georgios Theodorakopoulos

Decentralized and unstructured networks are becoming more prevalent today (e.g. ad hoc networks). Like every network, they depend on the cooperation of their users to survive. However, each user does not necessarily know who the others are, or what their i ...

2006

Coalition Formation in MANETs

Georgios Theodorakopoulos, Tao Jiang

Wireless ad-hoc networks rely on the cooperation of participating nodes for almost all their functions. However, due to resource constraints, nodes are generally selfish and try to maximize their own benefit when participating in the network. Therefore, it ...

2006

On Selfish Behavior in CSMA/CA Networks

Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Imad Aad, Mario Cagalj

CSMA/CA protocols rely on the random deferment of packet transmissions. Like most other protocols, CSMA/CA was designed with the assumption that the nodes would play by the rules. This can be dangerous, since the nodes themselves control their random defer ...

2005

On Cheating in CSMA/CA Ad Hoc Networks

Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Imad Aad, Mario Cagalj

CSMA/CA protocols rely on the random deferment of packet transmissions. Like most other protocols, CSMA/CA was designed with the assumption that the nodes would play by the rules. This is important, since the nodes themselves control their random deferment ...

2004

A Dynamic Analysis of Takeover Deals with Competition and Imperfect Information

Erwan Morellec

This article develops an equilibrium framework for the joint determination of the timing and the terms of takeovers in the presence of competition and imperfect information. The model analyzes takeovers as exchange options and derives equilibrium restructu ...

2003

Rational Exchange -- A Formal Model Based on Game Theory

Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Levente Buttyan

We introduce game theory as a formal framework in which exchange protocols can be modeled and their properties can be studied. We use this framework to give a formal definition for rational exchange relating it to the concept of Nash equilibrium in games. ...

2001