Publication

Multi-terminal Secrecy in a Linear Non-coherent Packetized Networks

Publications associées (35)

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Group secret key agreement over state-dependent wireless broadcast channels

Christina Fragouli, Suhas Diggavi, Mahdi Jafari Siavoshani

We consider a group of m trusted nodes that aim to create a shared secret key K, using a state-dependent wireless broadcast channel that exists from one of the honest nodes to the rest of the nodes including a passive eavesdropper Eve. All of the trusted n ...

Ieee Service Center, 445 Hoes Lane, Po Box 1331, Piscataway, Nj 08855-1331 Usa2011

A Mobile World of Security

Christine Neuberg

Security in mobile communications is a topic of increasing relevance in everyday life. We all use mobile devices for everyday communications, maybe even for exchanging confidential information with the work place. This requires security systems that are re ...

EPFL2011

Group Secret Key Generation over Broadcast Erasure Channels

Christina Fragouli, Suhas Diggavi, Mahdi Jafari Siavoshani, Uday Kiran Pulleti

We consider a group of m trusted nodes that aim to create a shared secret key K over a wireless channel in the presence an eavesdropper Eve. We assume an erasure broadcast channel from one of the honest nodes to the rest of them including Eve. All of the t ...

2010

Signatures for Multisource Network Coding

László Czap

We consider the problem of securing inter-ﬂow network coding with multiple sources. We present a practical homomorphic signature scheme that makes possible to verify network coded packets composed of data originating from diﬀerent sources. The multi-source ...

ArXiv2010

Erased Secrets: Practical Information-Theoretic Group Secrecy

Christina Fragouli, Suhas Diggavi, Mahdi Jafari Siavoshani, Uday Kiran Pulleti

We consider the scenario where a group of wireless nodes want to exchange a secret key, such that no eavesdropper can guess the key. Today, this can be achieved using publickey cryptography, e.g., the Diffie-Hellman or the RSA keyexchange algorithms. Howev ...

2010

Faster Squaring in the Cyclotomic Subgroup of Sixth Degree Extensions

Robert Granger

This paper describes an extremely efficient squaring operation in the so-called ‘cyclotomic subgroup’ of

\mathbb{F}_{q^6}

, for

q \equiv 1 \bmod{6}

. Our result arises from considering the Weil restriction of scalars of this group from

\mathbb{F}_{q^6}

...

Springer Berlin Heidelberg2010

Interference-Resilient Information Exchange

Rachid Guerraoui, Seth Gilbert

This paper presents an efficient protocol for reliably exchanging information in a single-hop, multi-channel radio network subject to unpredictable interference. We model the interference by an adversary that can simultaneously disrupt up to t of the C ava ...

Ieee Service Center, 445 Hoes Lane, Po Box 1331, Piscataway, Nj 08855-1331 Usa2009

Information-theoretic secrecy for wireless networks

Etienne Perron

The aim of information-theoretic secrecy is to ensure that an eavesdropper who listens to the wireless transmission of a message can only collect an arbitrarily small number of information bits about this message. In contrast to cryptography, there are no ...

EPFL2009

Secure communication using authenticated channels

Sylvain Pasini

Our main motivation is to design more user-friendly security protocols. Indeed, if the use of the protocol is tedious, most users will not behave correctly and, consequently, security issues occur. An example is the actual behavior of a user in front of an ...

EPFL2009

Integrity (I) codes: Message Integrity Protection and Authentication over Insecure Channels

Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Mario Cagalj, Srdan Capkun

Inspired by unidirectional error detecting codes that are used in situations where only one kind of bit errors are possible (e.g., it is possible to change a bit “0” into a bit “1”, but not the contrary), we propose integrity codes (I-codes) for a radio co ...

2006