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PROFACTORY: Improving IoT Security via Formalized Protocol Customization

Publications associées (48)

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Effectiveness of Distance-Decreasing Attacks Against Impulse Radio Ranging

Jean-Yves Le Boudec, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Panagiotis Papadimitratos, Marcin Poturalski, Manuel Flury

We expose the vulnerability of an emerging wireless ranging technology, impulse radio ultra-wide band (IR-UWB), to distance-decreasing attacks on the physical communication layer (PHY). These attacks violate the security of secure ranging protocols that al ...

2010

Smashing SQUASH-0

Serge Vaudenay, Khaled Ouafi

At the RFID Security Workshop 2007, Adi Shamir presented a new challenge-response protocol well suited for RFIDs, although based on the Rabin public-key cryptosystem. This protocol, which we call SQUASH-0, was using a linear mixing function which was subse ...

Springer2009

Mutual Authentication in RFID: Security and Privacy

Serge Vaudenay, Radu-Ioan Paise

In RFID protocols, tags identify and authenticate themselves to readers. At Asiacrypt 2007, Vaudenay studied security and privacy models for these protocols. We extend this model to protocols which offer reader authentication to tags. Whenever corruption i ...

ACM Press2008

SAS-Based Group Authentication and Key Agreement Protocols

Sylvain Pasini

New trends in consumer electronics have created a strong demand for fast, reliable and user-friendly key agreement protocols. However, many key agreement protocols are secure only against passive attacks. Therefore, message authentication is often unavoida ...

Springer2008

Secrecy for bounded security protocols with freshness check is NEXPTIME-complete

The secrecy problem for security protocols is the problem to decide whether or not a given security protocol has leaky runs. In this paper, the (initial) secrecy problem for bounded protocols with freshness check is shown to be NEXPTIME-complete. Relating ...

2008

Virtual Infrastructure for Collision-Prone Wireless Networks

Seth Gilbert

Wireless ad hoc networks pose several significant challenges: devices are unreliable; deployments are unpredictable; and communication is erratic. One proposed solution is Virtual Infrastructure, an abstraction in which unpredictable and unreliable devices ...

2008

Security-Preserving Asymmetric Protocol Encapsulation

Serge Vaudenay

Query-response based protocols between a client and a server such as SSL, TLS, SSH are asymmetric in the sense that the querying client and the responding server play different roles, and for which there is a need for two-way linkability between queries an ...

Springer-Verlag2007

How to specify and how to prove correctness of secure routing protocols for MANET

Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Panagiotis Papadimitratos

Secure routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks have been developed recently yet, it has been unclear what are the properties they achieve, as a formal analysis of these protocols is mostly lacking. In this paper we are concerned with this problem, how ...

Ieee Service Center, 445 Hoes Lane, Po Box 1331, Piscataway, Nj 08855-1331 Usa2006

How to specify and how to prove correctness of secure routing protocols for MANET

Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Panagiotis Papadimitratos

Secure routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks have been developed recently, yet, it has been unclear what are the properties they achieve, as a formal analysis of these protocols is mostly lacking. In this paper we are concerned with this problem, ho ...

Ieee Service Center, 445 Hoes Lane, Po Box 1331, Piscataway, Nj 08855-1331 Usa2006

How to Specify and How to Prove Correctness of Secure Routing Protocols for MANET

Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Panagiotis Papadimitratos

2006