Symmetric Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Resource Allocation

Publications associées (21)

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Courtesy As a Means to Coordinate

Boi Faltings, Panayiotis Danassis

We investigate the problem of multi-agent coordination under rationality constraints. Specifically, role allocation, task assignment, resource allocation, etc. Inspired by human behavior, we propose a framework (CA^3NONY) that enables fast convergence to e ...

International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems2019

Walrasian Dynamics in Multi-unit Markets

Aris Filos Ratsikas

In a multi-unit market, a seller brings multiple units of a good and tries to sell them to a set of buyers that have monetary endowments. While a Walrasian equilibrium does not always exist in this model, natural relaxations of the concept that retain its ...

AAAI Press2019

On Risk Reduction in Kelly Betting Using the Conservative Expected Value

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The celebrated Kelly betting strategy guarantees, with probability one, higher long-run wealth than any other causal investment strategy. However, on the way to its long-term supremacy, this strategy has a notable downfall: it typically displays high varia ...

2018

Finding Mixed Nash Equilibria of Generative Adversarial Networks

Volkan Cevher, Ya-Ping Hsieh, Chen Liu

We reconsider the training objective of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) from the mixed Nash Equilibria (NE) perspective. Inspired by the classical prox methods, we develop a novel algorithmic framework for GANs via an infinite-dimensional two-player ...

2018

Robust Multidimensional Pricing: Separation without Regret

Daniel Kuhn, Napat Rujeerapaiboon, Cagil Kocyigit

We study a robust monopoly pricing problem with a minimax regret objective, where a seller endeavors to sell multiple goods to a single buyer, only knowing that the buyer's values for the goods range over a rectangular uncertainty set. We interpret this pr ...

2022

A rational decentralized generalized Nash equilibrium seeking for energy markets

Matteo Salani, Lorenzo Nespoli, Vasco Medici

We propose a method to design a decentralized energy market which guarantees individual rationality (IR) in expectation, in the presence of system-level grid constraints. We formulate the market as a welfare maximization problem subject to IR constraints, ...

IEEE2018

A heterogeneous evolutionary stable population under assortative matching: Exploring the diversity of preferences

Boris Thurm, Charles Chadi Ayoubi

Recent studies have shown that a population acting not only upon self-interest but also exhibiting some morality preference has an evolutionary advantage. Specifically, in the setting of a symmetric fitness game, a resident population is evolutionary stabl ...

2017

Elicitation and Aggregation of Crowd Information

Goran Radanovic

This thesis addresses challenges in elicitation and aggregation of crowd information for settings where an information collector, called center, has a limited knowledge about information providers, called agents. Each agent is assumed to have noisy private ...

EPFL2016

Incentivizing Truthful Responses with the Logarithmic Peer Truth Serum

Boi Faltings, Goran Radanovic

We consider a participatory sensing scenario where a group of private sensors observes the same phenomenon, such as air pollution. We design a novel payment mechanism that incentivizes participation and honest behavior using the peer prediction approach, i ...

2015

Incentive Schemes for Participatory Sensing

Boi Faltings, Goran Radanovic

We consider a participatory sensing scenario where a group of private sensors observes the same phenomenon, such as air pollution. Since sensors need to be installed and maintained, owners of sensors are inclined to provide inaccurate or random data. We de ...

2015

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