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A financial system is a system that allows the exchange of funds between financial market participants such as lenders, investors, and borrowers. Financial systems operate at national and global levels. Financial institutions consist of complex, closely related services, markets, and institutions intended to provide an efficient and regular linkage between investors and borrowers. In other words, financial systems can be known wherever there exists the exchange of a financial medium (money) while there is a reallocation of funds into needy areas (financial markets, business firms, banks) to utilize the potential of ideal money and place it in use to get benefits out of it. This whole mechanism is known as a financial system. Money, credit, and finance are used as media of exchange in financial systems. They serve as a medium of known value for which goods and services can be exchanged as an alternative to bartering. A modern financial system may include banks (public sector or private sector), financial markets, financial instruments, and financial services. Financial systems allow funds to be allocated, invested, or moved between economic sectors, and they enable individuals and companies to share the associated risks. There are mainly four components of the financial system: Financial markets - the market place where buyers and sellers interact with each other and participate in the trading of bonds, shares and other assets are called financial markets. Financial instruments - the products which are traded in the financial markets are called financial instruments. Based on different requirements and credit seekers, the securities in the market also differ from each others. Financial institutions - financial institutions are acting as a mediator between the investors and borrowers. They provide financial services for members and clients. It is also termed as financial intermediaries because they act as middlemen between the savers and borrowers. The investor's savings are mobilized either directly or indirectly via the financial markets.

Essays in Bank Financing

Yalda Sigrist

This thesis examines the optimal mode of financing for banks and financial institutions. The first chapter, which is a joint work with Prof. Jean-Charles Rochet, investigates how Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) should be financed. The main specificity of such firms is that their failure imposes negative externalities on the financial system and, more broadly, on the whole economy. Since their shareholders do not internalize these externalities, they tend to provide less capital than what would be socially optimal, generating too many failures. In jurisdictions where they receive tax exemptions, CoCo bonds are a simple means of increasing the resilience of SIFIs while providing large tax benefits to banks' shareholders. However, we show that when tax revenues are properly accounted for, these CoCo bonds are detrimental to social welfare. The second chapter provides a formal model of a bail-in plan, a pre-defined contract that results in self-recapitalization of a financial institution when it is in distress and has no access to equity financing. Bail-ins have the potential to eliminate inefficient bank liquidations and ease financing constraints in bad times. Using a theoretical model of a bail-in contract where banks face time varying financing frictions, taxation and liquidation costs, I show that banks' capital structure decisions and optimal financing and pay-out policies are largely affected by the design of the contingent capital (specifically the conversion ratio). However independent of its design, for an optimal level of debt, bail-in contracts always decrease shareholders incentives to build up liquid buffers and to recapitalize in good times but also eliminate any risk-taking incentives. The third chapter presents a model of bank optimal maturity structure when banks face systemic risk through correlated investments. Banks can privately affect the probability of success of their projects. Risky short-term debt can act as a disciplinary device if it is not rolled over when an adverse interim-date signal on the quality of banks' assets is received. The optimal maturity structure is the result of the trade-off between the disciplinary benefits of short-term debt and the costs of inefficient early liquidations. I show that bank asset commonality affects this trade-off since it reduces the costs of exerting effort through positive information synergies and increases the inefficiency of early liquidations through negative fire-sale externalities. In particular, there is a more important role for the disciplinary effects of short-term debt in high correlation, high fire-sale externalities and low information synergies environments.

EPFL2017

Essays in Bank Financing

Yalda Sigrist

EPFL2017