Black's methodBlack's method is an election method proposed by Duncan Black in 1958 as a compromise between the Condorcet method and the Borda count. This method selects a Condorcet winner. If a Condorcet winner does not exist, then the candidate with the highest Borda score is selected. Among methods satisfying the majority criterion, Black's method gives the minimum power to the majority and hence the method is best at protecting minorities. Black's method satisfies the following criteria: Unrestricted domain Non-imposition (a.
Tideman alternative methodTideman's Alternative Methods, including Alternative Smith and Alternative Schwartz, are two electoral systems developed by Nicolaus Tideman which select a single winner using votes that express preferences. These methods can also create a sorted list of winners. These methods are Smith- and Schwartz-efficient, respectively, and thus are Condorcet methods. They operate by using instant-runoff voting for cycle resolution. Tideman's Alternative procedure is as follows: Identify the Smith or Schwartz set.
Highest median voting rulesHighest median voting rules are cardinal voting rules, where the winning candidate is a candidate with the highest median rating. As these employ ratings, each voter rates the different candidates on an ordered, numerical or verbal scale. The various highest median rules differ in their treatment of ties, i.e., the method of ranking the candidates with the same median rating. Proponents of highest median rules argue that they provide the most faithful reflection of the voters' opinion.
Majority loser criterionThe majority loser criterion is a criterion to evaluate single-winner voting systems. The criterion states that if a majority of voters prefers every other candidate over a given candidate, then that candidate must not win. Either of the Condorcet loser criterion or the mutual majority criterion implies the majority loser criterion. However, the Condorcet criterion does not imply the majority loser criterion, since the minimax method satisfies the Condorcet but not the majority loser criterion.
