The fact–value distinction is a fundamental epistemological distinction described between:
Statements of fact (positive or descriptive statements), based upon reason and physical observation, and which are examined via the empirical method.
Statements of value (normative or prescriptive statements), which encompass ethics and aesthetics, and are studied via axiology.
This barrier between fact and value, as construed in epistemology, implies it is impossible to derive ethical claims from factual arguments, or to defend the former using the latter.
The fact–value distinction is closely related to, and derived from, the is–ought problem in moral philosophy, characterized by David Hume.
Religion and science
In his essay Science as a Vocation (1917) Max Weber draws a distinction between facts and values. He argues that facts can be determined through the methods of a value-free, objective social science, while values are derived through culture and religion, the truth of which cannot be known through science. He writes, "it is one thing to state facts, to determine mathematical or logical relations or the internal structure of cultural values, while it is another thing to answer questions of the value of culture and its individual contents and the question of how one should act in the cultural community and in political associations. These are quite heterogeneous problems." In his 1919 essay Politics as a Vocation, he argues that facts, like actions, do not in themselves contain any intrinsic meaning or power: "any ethic in the world could establish substantially identical commandments applicable to all relationships."
To MLK Jr., "Science deals mainly with facts; religion deals mainly with values. The two are not rivals. They are complementary." He stated that science keeps religion from"crippling irrationalism and paralyzing obscurantism" whereas Religion prevents science from "falling into ... obsolete materialism and moral nihilism.
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The is–ought problem, as articulated by the Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume, arises when one makes claims about what ought to be that are based solely on statements about what is. Hume found that there seems to be a significant difference between descriptive or positive statements (about what is) and prescriptive or normative statements (about what ought to be), and that it is not obvious how one can coherently transition from descriptive statements to prescriptive ones.
In philosophical ethics, the naturalistic fallacy is the claim that it is possible to give a reductive explanation of good, in terms of natural properties such as pleasant or desirable. The term was introduced by British philosopher G. E. Moore in his 1903 book Principia Ethica. Moore's naturalistic fallacy is closely related to the is–ought problem, which comes from David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1738–40). However, unlike Hume's view of the is–ought problem, Moore (and other proponents of ethical non-naturalism) did not consider the naturalistic fallacy to be at odds with moral realism.
Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately.
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