In politics, a revolving door is a situation in which personnel move between roles as legislators and regulators, on one hand, and employees or lobbyists of the industries affected by the legislation and regulation, on the other. It is analogous to the movement of people in a physical revolving door. Political analysts claim that an unhealthy relationship can develop between the private sector and government, based on the granting of reciprocated privileges to the detriment of the nation, and can lead to regulatory capture. The term has also been used in a different context, to refer to the constant switching and ousting of political leaders from offices such as in Australia (which changed Prime Ministers 6 times from 2007-2018) and Japan. The revolving door phenomenon has become a public interest in the 2010s, with the writings of Andrew Baker, Simon Johnson and James Kwak. In the literature, it has been described as a means to influence the financial industry. This theory gained a new level of importance in the United States, following the 2008 crisis, when prominent government figures insinuated that previous and future hirings in the financial sphere manipulates the decision-making of eminent government members when it comes to financial matters. Governments hire industry professionals for their private sector experience, their influence within corporations that the government is attempting to regulate or do business with, and in order to gain political support (donations and endorsements) from private firms. Industry, in turn, hires people out of government positions to gain personal access to government officials, seek favorable legislation/regulation and government contracts in exchange for high-paying employment offers, and get inside information on what is going on in government. In fact, the regulator while in office takes actions and makes decisions enabling him to cash in later when joining a firm he has regulated. These actions are termed as bureaucratic capital.