Condorcet winner criterionAn electoral system satisfies the Condorcet winner criterion (pronkɒndɔrˈseɪ) if it always chooses the Condorcet winner when one exists. The candidate who wins a majority of the vote in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates - that is, a candidate preferred by more voters than any others - is the Condorcet winner, although Condorcet winners do not exist in all cases. It is sometimes simply referred to as the "Condorcet criterion", though it is very different from the "Condorcet loser criterion".
Ranked pairsRanked pairs (sometimes abbreviated "RP") or the Tideman method is an electoral system developed in 1987 by Nicolaus Tideman that selects a single winner using votes that express preferences. The ranked-pairs procedure can also be used to create a sorted list of winners. If there is a candidate who is preferred over the other candidates, when compared in turn with each of the others, the ranked-pairs procedure guarantees that candidate will win. Because of this property, the ranked-pairs procedure complies with the Condorcet winner criterion (and is a Condorcet method).
Positional votingPositional voting is a ranked voting electoral system in which the options or candidates receive points based on their rank position on each ballot and the one with the most points overall wins. The lower-ranked preference in any adjacent pair is generally of less value than the higher-ranked one. Although it may sometimes be weighted the same, it is never worth more. A valid progression of points or weightings may be chosen at will (Eurovision Song Contest) or it may form a mathematical sequence such as an arithmetic progression (Borda count), a geometric one (positional number system) or a harmonic one (Nauru/Dowdall method).
Score votingScore voting or range voting is an electoral system for single-seat elections, in which voters give each candidate a score, the scores are added (or averaged), and the candidate with the highest total is elected. It has been described by various other names including evaluative voting, utilitarian voting, interval measure voting, the point system, ratings summation, 0-99 voting, average voting and utility voting. It is a type of cardinal voting electoral system, and aims to implement the utilitarian social choice rule.
Independence of irrelevant alternativesThe independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), also known as binary independence or the independence axiom, is an axiom of decision theory and various social sciences. The term is used in different connotation in several contexts. Although it always attempts to provide an account of rational individual behavior or aggregation of individual preferences, the exact formulation differs widely in both language and exact content. Perhaps the easiest way to understand the axiom is how it pertains to casting a ballot.
Condorcet methodA Condorcet method (pronkɒndɔrˈseɪ; kɔ̃dɔʁsɛ) is an election method that elects the candidate who wins a majority of the vote in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates, that is, a candidate preferred by more voters than any others, whenever there is such a candidate. A candidate with this property, the pairwise champion or beats-all winner, is formally called the Condorcet winner. The head-to-head elections need not be done separately; a voter's choice within any given pair can be determined from the ranking.
Vote splittingVote splitting is an electoral effect in which the distribution of votes among multiple similar candidates reduces the chance of winning for any of the similar candidates, and increases the chance of winning for a dissimilar candidate. This is commonly known as the spoiler effect, which can discourage minor party candidacies. Vote splitting most easily occurs in plurality voting (also called first-past-the-post) in which each voter indicates a single choice and the candidate with the most votes wins, even if the winner does not have majority support.
Minimax Condorcet methodIn voting systems, the Minimax Condorcet method (often referred to as "the Minimax method") is one of several Condorcet methods used for tabulating votes and determining a winner when using ranked voting in a single-winner election. It is sometimes referred to as the Simpson–Kramer method, and the successive reversal method. Minimax selects as the winner the candidate whose greatest pairwise defeat is smaller than the greatest pairwise defeat of any other candidate: or, put another way, "the only candidate whose support never drops below [N] percent" in any pairwise contest, with N as high as possible.
Bullet votingBullet voting, also known as single-shot voting and plump voting, is a voting tactic, usually in multiple-winner elections, where a voter is entitled to vote for more than one candidate, but instead votes for only one candidate. A voter might do this because it is easier than evaluating all the candidates or as a form of tactical voting. Voters can use this tactic to maximize the chance that their favorite candidate will be elected while increasing the risk that other favored candidates will lose.
Black's methodBlack's method is an election method proposed by Duncan Black in 1958 as a compromise between the Condorcet method and the Borda count. This method selects a Condorcet winner. If a Condorcet winner does not exist, then the candidate with the highest Borda score is selected. Among methods satisfying the majority criterion, Black's method gives the minimum power to the majority and hence the method is best at protecting minorities. Black's method satisfies the following criteria: Unrestricted domain Non-imposition (a.
