Second-order arithmeticIn mathematical logic, second-order arithmetic is a collection of axiomatic systems that formalize the natural numbers and their subsets. It is an alternative to axiomatic set theory as a foundation for much, but not all, of mathematics. A precursor to second-order arithmetic that involves third-order parameters was introduced by David Hilbert and Paul Bernays in their book Grundlagen der Mathematik. The standard axiomatization of second-order arithmetic is denoted by Z2.
Non-standard model of arithmeticIn mathematical logic, a non-standard model of arithmetic is a model of (first-order) Peano arithmetic that contains non-standard numbers. The term standard model of arithmetic refers to the standard natural numbers 0, 1, 2, .... The elements of any model of Peano arithmetic are linearly ordered and possess an initial segment isomorphic to the standard natural numbers. A non-standard model is one that has additional elements outside this initial segment. The construction of such models is due to Thoralf Skolem (1934).
Complete theoryIn mathematical logic, a theory is complete if it is consistent and for every closed formula in the theory's language, either that formula or its negation is provable. That is, for every sentence the theory contains the sentence or its negation but not both (that is, either or ). Recursively axiomatizable first-order theories that are consistent and rich enough to allow general mathematical reasoning to be formulated cannot be complete, as demonstrated by Gödel's first incompleteness theorem.
Presburger arithmeticPresburger arithmetic is the first-order theory of the natural numbers with addition, named in honor of Mojżesz Presburger, who introduced it in 1929. The signature of Presburger arithmetic contains only the addition operation and equality, omitting the multiplication operation entirely. The axioms include a schema of induction. Presburger arithmetic is much weaker than Peano arithmetic, which includes both addition and multiplication operations. Unlike Peano arithmetic, Presburger arithmetic is a decidable theory.
Gentzen's consistency proofGentzen's consistency proof is a result of proof theory in mathematical logic, published by Gerhard Gentzen in 1936. It shows that the Peano axioms of first-order arithmetic do not contain a contradiction (i.e. are "consistent"), as long as a certain other system used in the proof does not contain any contradictions either. This other system, today called "primitive recursive arithmetic with the additional principle of quantifier-free transfinite induction up to the ordinal ε0", is neither weaker nor stronger than the system of Peano axioms.
EquiconsistencyIn mathematical logic, two theories are equiconsistent if the consistency of one theory implies the consistency of the other theory, and vice versa. In this case, they are, roughly speaking, "as consistent as each other". In general, it is not possible to prove the absolute consistency of a theory T. Instead we usually take a theory S, believed to be consistent, and try to prove the weaker statement that if S is consistent then T must also be consistent—if we can do this we say that T is consistent relative to S.
Set-theoretic definition of natural numbersIn set theory, several ways have been proposed to construct the natural numbers. These include the representation via von Neumann ordinals, commonly employed in axiomatic set theory, and a system based on equinumerosity that was proposed by Gottlob Frege and by Bertrand Russell. Zermelo ordinals In Zermelo–Fraenkel (ZF) set theory, the natural numbers are defined recursively by letting 0 = {} be the empty set and n + 1 = n ∪ {n} for each n. In this way n = {0, 1, ..., n − 1} for each natural number n.
Gödel's incompleteness theoremsGödel's incompleteness theorems are two theorems of mathematical logic that are concerned with the limits of in formal axiomatic theories. These results, published by Kurt Gödel in 1931, are important both in mathematical logic and in the philosophy of mathematics. The theorems are widely, but not universally, interpreted as showing that Hilbert's program to find a complete and consistent set of axioms for all mathematics is impossible. The first incompleteness theorem states that no consistent system of axioms whose theorems can be listed by an effective procedure (i.
Decidability (logic)In logic, a true/false decision problem is decidable if there exists an effective method for deriving the correct answer. Zeroth-order logic (propositional logic) is decidable, whereas first-order and higher-order logic are not. Logical systems are decidable if membership in their set of logically valid formulas (or theorems) can be effectively determined. A theory (set of sentences closed under logical consequence) in a fixed logical system is decidable if there is an effective method for determining whether arbitrary formulas are included in the theory.
SemiringIn abstract algebra, a semiring is an algebraic structure. It is a generalization of a ring, dropping the requirement that each element must have an additive inverse. At the same time, it is a generalization of bounded distributive lattices. The smallest semiring that is not a ring is the two-element Boolean algebra, e.g. with logical disjunction as addition. A motivating example that is neither a ring nor a lattice is the set of natural numbers under ordinary addition and multiplication, when including the number zero.